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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

There are things hard to define, despite the fact that
we usually
assume that we know what they are. One simple example is
''beauty." Most
of us presuppose that we know what "beauty" means,

our daily life. However,

it

and use this term in

is not easy to explain its precise

definition. The same thing can be said about such things as "freedom,"
"liberty," or "love." In a sense,

it

is

unnecessary to define these

things, since they are things to be experienced or felt rather than

defined intellectually.

"Obscenity" is one of the things which we

usually do not bother defining. Probably, many people believe that they
know what "obscenity" is. On the other hand,

I

suspect that no one can

logically explain what "obscenity" is. As long as this term is used in
the private sphere of life, such ambiguity may be permissible. Just

like other intangible things, obscenity may stay as something to be

perceived intuitively. However, once this term is used legally, we need
to be sure about its meaning.

There are numerous books dealing with the question of obscenity.
In many societies,

considerable amounts of effort and resources have

been invested in order to answer the questions surrounding obscenity.
Yet,

the obscenity issue is still very controversial in most places in

the modern world.

In a sense,

this issue is now getting more

complicated. The technological development made larger scale of mass

1

communications and many new styles of expression possible.
Industrialization and the world-wide market economy
introduced mass-

production and mass-consumption. Social fragmentation
has escalated
because of modern individualism, liberalism, and pluralism.
Artists
have been getting more diverse in their tastes and themes,
and more

challenging to the conventional norms. Because of these factors,
various new sexual representations have appeared in public spaces. As
result,

to answer questions concerning sexual

a

representations is

getting harder in our contemporary society. Donald

A.

Downs argues that

every society is inherently ambivalent about sexual freedom. Materials

dealing with sexual activity are prevalent in many modern societies,
just because such materials manifest "the tensions that arise between

desire and social norms" (Hall, Ed., 1992, 603). Governments have

struggled with the question how to deal with these materials. Downs
points out that this struggle is particularly acute in a liberal
democracy, because of the conflict between liberal and democratic

principles (Hall, Ed.,

1992,

603).

In both Japan and the U.S.,

two

liberal democracies, the regulation of obscene materials has been

a

source of disputes for a long time. Despite the premise that no

arbitrary deprivation of certain information or denial of certain ideas
is allowed under the theory of liberal democracy,

the standard of

regulating obscenity seems to be highly subjective and even sometimes
arbitrary.

Obscenity includes offensive, indecent or pornographic material.
Precise definitions of "obscene" have been notoriously vague and even
2

unworkable. Etymologically, "obscene" may be
Latin

scena,

a

modification of the

meaning literally what is off, or to one side of
the

stage, beyond presentation (Nead,

1992,

25). The Latin root

means "ill-omened" or "adverse" (Downs,

1989,

"

obscaenus"

Obscenity refers to

9).

those things considered not appropriate to be shown,
because of being

disgusting, offensive,
(Downs,

1989,

9).

filthy,

foul,

repulsive or morally unhealthy

Downs says that the word "obscenity" is original
ly

not only for sexual representation (Downs,

1989,

9).

In both the U.S.

and Japan, however, obscenity law has confined the concept of the

obscene to sexually explicit depictions. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "depictions of violence per se are not obscene" (Downs.
1989,

9).

Legally,

the decades.

the criteria for obscenity have been revised over

Judicial efforts to find

a

definition of obscenity remain

elusive in both the U.S. and Japan, and what is or is not obscene has
been subjected to
(1948),

a

continuous debate. For

example,

in State v.

the Court held that "(O)bscenity is a literary work that tends

to arouse impure sex ideas in minds susceptible of such ideas"

1969,

Lerner

144).

(Grazia,

However, this is not a definition but a test. Moreover, it

is not clear how such a test should be applied practically,

how

a

court

can know if a literary work in question arouses sexual ideas in the

reader’s mind, or how a court can decide pureness or impureness of

certain ideas. Until these points are clarified, the courts can censor,
suppress, and punish what they just don’t like.

In 1964, United States

Supreme Court Justice Stewart confessed his inability to define

obscenity but claimed

"I

know it when

3

I

see it"

(

Jacobellis

v.

Ohio,

378 U.S.

184,

197).

Such a reliance on subjectivity is the central

problem with obscenity issues. Many scholars have
criticized the

definitions which have been too loose and too capricious
to be legally
workable. As Gellhorn points out:

Those who urge increased repression of allegedly obscene
books are
of course convinced that "obscenity" can be identified.
In
reality, however, the word does not refer to a thing so much
as to
a mood (Downs, Ed., 1960, 22).

In 1954,

in an effort to discern what constitutes obscenity,

Federal Judge Ernest Tolin consulted the settled authority of judicial

utterances. He found fourteen different judicial definitions of the
term. As Lockhart and McClure complained,

"(N)o one seems to know what

obscenity is. Many writers have discussed the obscene, but few can
agree upon even its essential nature" (Downs, Ed.,

1960,

24).

It

is now

widely recognized that "obscenity" cannot be defined so that it will
mean the same thing to all people all the time, since the boundary

between acceptable and unacceptable sexually explicit expressions is
unclear. Schroeder argues that:

The ethnographic facts, ... show that there is not a single
element of objective nature which is a constituent factor of every
conception of either modesty or obscenity. Thus, ... the only
unifying element common to all conceptions of modesty or of

obscenity must be subjective - must be in the mind of the
contemplating person, not in the thing contemplated (Schroeder,
1911,

259).

He mentions various standards of obscenity. Here are some

examples. As is widely known, Chinese women are offended if they are

compelled to expose their naked feet. Some tribes,
who do not mind

wearing only little clothing, believe it indecent
to eat in each
other

s

presence. Based on this belief, even family members
of these

tribes turn their backs toward each other while eating.
There are
several other tribes in which women cover only their
breasts. They

consider it unnecessary to cover those parts of the body which

everybody has been able to see from their birth, but breasts should
be
covered because they come later (Schroeder,

examples are only

a

1911,

259-60). These

part of his observation. As we can see, ten

different imaginations, interpretations, and logics make ten different
acts obscene or modest. Blanshard says;

Defining the word 'obscenity’ in legal terms is something like
estimating the number of angels that can dance on the point of a
pin. It is a matter of imagination and surmise (Downs, Ed., 1960,
185)

.

This is true not only when we see things in international scope but
also in one nation.

In 1938,

there was a case involving Life magazine

which featured an article entitled "The Birth of

a Baby." This was an

article, accompanied by stills from a motion picture of the same name,
and two sets of anatomical diagrams, aimed at educating the public to
the avoidable dangers of childbirth.

It was

dignified and scientific in

writing and illustration. Still, an influential Catholic lay

organization accused this article of being obscene (Ernst and Schwartz,
1964,

114). According to the assumptions and imagination of the people

in the Catholic organization,

probably,

5

the article and the pictures

were intolerably shameful or lewd. D.H. Lawrence,
the author of Lady
Ch atterley s Lover
the

,

states that "(W)hat is pornography to one man is

laughter of genius to another” (Downs, Ed.,

of obscenity keeps changing over time,

"obscenity” is a variable and that

" (

I

too.
)

1960,

171). The concept

Gellhorn contends that

ts dimensions are fixed in part

by the eye of the individual beholder and in part by
a generalized

opinion that shifts with time and place" (Downs, Ed., 1960,
22). This
claim sounds correct. D.H. Lawrence mentioned the fact that Hamlet,

which shocked all the Cromwellian Puritans, shocks nobody today. The
opposite can also be true. This is because the human being is

a

constantly changing creature. As a person changes, everything must
change with him or her, including the meanings of the words one uses.

Lawrence argues that "things are not what they seemed, and what’s what
becomes what isn’t, and if we think we know where we are it’s only

because we are so rapidly being translated to somewhere else” (Downs,
Ed.,

1960,

171).

In the United Kingdom,

the Williams Committee in 1979

presented a comment concerning the difficulty in fixing a legally

workable definition of obscenity. The Committee declared that the level
of offensiveness is necessarily something relative to people’s

conception of current reactions. Even if some definite standard is
fixed, such a standard will hardly be valid, since the social reality

will have changed by the time the legislation is enacted (Article 19,
1991,

414).
It is a

difficult question how to develop

a

constitutional

standard when literature dealing with sex is concerned, because
6

societies are afraid of the degrading effects of
"obscene” materials on
sexual morality. However, if there is no clear
definition of

'obscenity",

there should not be any punishment or suppression
for it.

This is the rule of "due process of law." On this
point, Justice

Brennan said in an interview;

put sixteen years into that damn obscenity thing. I tried
and
tried, and I waffled back and forth, and I finally gave
up. If you
1

cannot define it, you cannot prosecute people for it. ... I
reached the conclusion that every criminal-obscenity statute ...
was necessarily unconstitutional, because it was impossible from
the statute, to define obscenity (Baum, 1992, 153).

It

is not very likely that we can find a solid legal basis for

punishing obscenity soon. There are many issues about which all
factions may never find acceptable answers. Among these issues in the

United States are:

Does obscenity or pornography do anyone any harm?;
2) Does pornography have a deleterious effect on social morality?;
3) Does the First Amendment, which guarantees free speech, protect
obscenity?; and
4) Can obscenity laws be enforced, using community standards (as
1)

proposed by the Supreme Court) or any other criteria? (Downs and
McCoy, Eds., 1984, 200).

In this thesis,

I

would like to consider these questions surrounding

the governmental regulation of obscene materials in the U.S.
In both countries,

and Japan.

this issue has been controversial, but the ways the

two countries have dealt with this issue are different.
In this introductory chapter,

I

first briefly examine the

significance of freedom of expression for
7

a

democracy. The American and

Japanese constitutional bases for freedom of
expression and its limits
will

be discussed.

The historical development of both freedom of

expression and regulation of obscenity will be traced.

I

perceive that

the two countries’ differences in dealing with
problems surrounding

freedom of expression are due to the differences in general
social and

cultural conditions, the rights consciousness of the the citizens,
the
status of laws and the judiciary,

the value system of the society,

the perceived relationships between the courts and morality.

Chapters

II

and III,

I

In

will look at several landmark cases in each

country. The focus of this thesis will be on literary works.
the U.S. and Japan,

and

In both

the definition of obscenity has been modified and

liberalized over decades, but the standard is still problematic. In

Chapter II, Roth

Stanley

v.

discussed.
(1957),

v.

U.S.

(1957), Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966),

Georgia (1969), and Miller
In Chapter

III,

I

v.

California (1973) will be

will address the Lady Chat ter ley case

the Marquis De Sade case (1969), and the

Yojohan case (1980).

Based on the two preceding chapters, in Chapter IV,

I

will attempt to

clarify the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Japan in
their approaches to obscenity cases. Here, various terms which the

courts use will be examined. These terms include "community standards,"

"prevailing ideas of society," "prurient interest," "patently
offensive," "sense of shame," and the "nonpublic nature of the sex
act." Different theories of regulating obscenity will be addressed in
this chapter.

In

Chapter V, the concluding chapter,

I

will examine the

following questions: What is the harm caused by "obscene" materials?;
8

What interest is supposed to be protected by
regulating "obscene"

materials?;

Is the danger posed by

"obscene" materials sufficient to

justify the use of judicial power for its regulation?

I

will also

examine the tension between the power of government and
the ideal of
freedom under liberal democracy.

In the discussion concerning

—

obscenity, the judiciaries have often mentioned public morality

especially sexual morality. However,

I

question whether or not

a

state

has the legitimate power to deprive a person of liberty in order to

preserve "morality," and whether it is a legitimate function of a
liberal and democratic government to decide what ideas are moral or

immoral, or pure or impure.

A,

It

Freedom of Expressi on in

is my belief that

Democracy

a

freedom of expression is one of the most

important elements of a democracy. A democracy is

a

system of

participation. This ideal, however, can be realized only when everyone
has the right to think, speak, and write freely, and to receive the

information one needs.

In a primitive society,

a person might

be able

to maintain one’s freedom even if one lacks these intellectual rights.

One can secure one’s freedom using physical force. In
on the other hand,

it

is impossible for any individual

a

civil society,
to secure one’s

freedom without having these intellectual rights. Freedom of

information
ideas

-

-

the right to seek,

is unique among all the

receive, and impart information and

freedoms.

9

It

is the guide,

the basis,

and the determinant of all the freedoms. Without
freedom of

information, any other freedoms cannot be fully
achieved. Also, it is

a

freedom very basic to the idea and practice of any
democracy, and it is
a

very special political right, because it makes the
criticism of

government possible and the exchange of ideas possible,
without which
there can be no real democracy.

It

means that the deprivation or

violation of these basic freedoms by the state is

a

threat to democracy

itself. Moreover, a democracy is a system whose core is tolerance of

diversity among individuals. Under this system, states should not
subjectively deny or promote particular values. In other words, debate
and competition among conflicting views are regarded as positive and

essential. This is another reason why those intellectual freedoms are

crucially important.

B.

Constitutional Basis for Freedom of Expression and Limits on It

In the U.S.,

freedom of speech and of the press are protected by

the First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.

In Japan,

freedom of speech, press, and all other forms of expression

are guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution which reads:

10

Freedom of assembly and association as well as
speech, press and
all other forms of expression are guaranteed;
2. No censorship
shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of
any means of
communication be violated.

Both provisions read as if freedom of expression in
these two

countries were absolute. However,
freedoms,

is not

freedom of expression,

like other

unconditionally unlimited. For example, maintenance of

public order, state security, public health, and public morals can
impose limits on the exercise of freedom. The crucial point concerning

restriction of freedom of expression is how to strike a balance between
freedom and these other interests. As Robert Emmet Long points out,
"(T)here are gray areas involving the nation’s moral well-being that
are debatable"

(Long,

1990,

44). On morality and individual rights in

the U.S., Richard Stengel points out that there has been a tension

"between the pursuit of individual liberty and the quest for Puritan

righteousness, between Benjamin Franklin’s open road of individualism
and Jonathan Edwards’ Great Awaking of moral fervor"

(Long,

1990,

46).

There are many unanswered questions concerning this balance:

What is the role of the state in enforcing the morality of its
citizenry? How far should government go in regulating private
conduct? Is morality a question of individual rights? Or should
the state play an active role in nurturing values deemed worthy by

the community? (Long,

1990,

46).

The proliferation of obscenity and pornography has long been

controversial, because regulation of obscenity embraces the questions

concerning this balance between the pursuit of individual liberty and

maintenance of morality.
11

c.

Freedom of Expression and Regulation of Obscenity
in Japan

Despite the fact that post-war Japan adopted

a

Constitution which

was based on the American idea of democracy, and that
the

constitutional presuppositions with respect to the individual’s
rights
are the same in the two countries, people’s perceptions of
freedom of

expression appear to be different in these two societies.

I

believe

that the function of freedom of expression is determined not only
by
law but also by society.

Freedom of expression in Japan, as compared

with that in the U.S., will be an interesting case study of the legal
and social limits of tolerance.
the Japanese

Constitution of 1949 guarantees freedom of

expression, but over the years the courts have endorsed limitations in
cases where free expression has come into conflict with the government.

Although Article 21 of the Constitution states that no censorship shall
be maintained,

the Supreme Court approved censorship of materials

imported into Japan and a comprehensive system for the censorship of
school textbooks by the Ministry of Education (Article 19, 1991, 178).
In fact,

freedom of expression in Japan has been restricted by both

formal and informal means. For example,

there exist such taboos as

criticism of the Emperor and royal family and of the relationship
between organized crime, the police and politicians. Criticism of the
U.S. military has been a taboo, also (Article 19,

1991,

178-9). As

Article 19 pointed out, there is no press law in Japan. Instead, the

media is largely self-regulating:

12

:

There is widespread self-censorship due to
a variety of informal
pressures: the traditions of the Japanese
people; influence
exerted by owners, advertisers and government
officials; and
occasional violence against journalists and others
targeted byextreme political groups (Article 19, 1991, 178).

In Japan,

the first state concern with allegedly immoral

expression is found in an ordinance issued in 1722. The first
national
law aimed at regulating expression for the maintainance
of public

morality was the press ordinance of 1869. This ordinance was revised
in
1873 and 1875.

In 1875,

the penalty for translating and publishing

materials disturbing public order and morality was prescribed for the
first time.

It was

Article 259 of the Criminal Code of 1880 which

introduced the legal notion of "obscenity" (Shimizu, 1970, 175-178).
Currently,

the regulation of obscene materials is prescribed in Article

175 of the Criminal Code which was originally enacted in 1907.

It

reads

A person who distributes or sells an obscene writing, picture, or
other object or who publicly displays the same, shall be punished
with imprisonment at forced labor for not more than two years or a
fine of not more than 5,000 yen or a minor fine. The same applies
to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale.

The constitutionality of Article 175 has been questioned by scholars,
on grounds that it improperly punishes expression that is not clearly

dangerous to society, and that it does not clearly enough distinguish
between obscene and unobjectionable material (Beer, 1984, 337). In

addition to this provision, there are such laws regulating obscenity as
the Customs Standards Law,

the Entertainment Facilities Law,
13

the

Law-

Regulating Businesses Affecting Public Morals, the Radio
Law, the
Broadcast Law, the Prison Law, and thirty-nine local youth
protection
ordinances. These are supplemented by

a

host of self-regulatory codes

administered by various industry ethics committees. In the many laws,

ministry and industry standards, the stress is on the regulation of
material disturbing to "good morals and manners" (Beer, 1984. 337). One
of the most controversial issues is the Custom Standards Law. Despite
the prohibition of censorship prescribed in Article 21 of the

Constitution, Article 21 of the Custom Standards Law of 1910 legalizes
a

censorship function over the import of "written material and pictures

harmful to public order and public morals" (Beer,
In

1951,

1984,

337).

obscenity was legally defined as an expression which

"wantonly stimulates or arouses sexual desire, or offends the normal
sense of sexual modesty (i.e., sense of shame) of ordinary persons, and
is contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality"

are three landmark obscenity cases in Japan.

I

(Maki,

1964,

7).

There

will take a look at

these three cases in Chapter III; the Lady Chatterley s Lover decision
’

(1957),

the Marquis de Sade decision (1969), and the

Yojohan decision

(1980). The Japanese Supreme Court has used terms such as "sense of

shame" and "the nonpublic nature of the sex act" that have never been

used by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In my opinion,

these words reflect

something very peculiar to Japanese culture. The standard of obscenityin the Japanese Supreme Court has been "the prevailing ideas of

society," which is not the sum of the idea of individuals but something

14

the courts can determine. The Japanese Supreme
Court has consistently

emphasized its

clinical role

1
'

in guarding morality.

One basic difference between the U.S. Supreme Court
and the

Japanese Supreme Court is the fact that the Japanese
Supreme Court had
no role in creating the concept of freedom, establishing
the basic

rules governing the relation between the state and the
people, or in

defining the nature of specific freedoms (Maki, 1964, 41 in
Introduction),

this is because the American occupation authority

reformed the Japanese judicial and legal system comprehensively after

World War II, and because Japan imported the concept of democratic
freedom from the U.S. Maki argues that the role of the Japanese Supreme
Court has been in the reconciliation of the doctrine of the public

welfare with the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms (Maki,
1964,

41

in Introduction).

Pre-war Japan had been highly intolerant of freedom of expression,
largely because of its group-oriented social norms. The Japanese have
been traditionally reticent and suspicious about assertions of

individual rights. Very often, assertion of individual rights can be
taken negatively. Similarly, to manifest unorthodoxy or disagreement
can be taken just as egocentric. Nakane Chie, in her prominent study of

Japanese society, points out that

a

man will find himself opposed on

any issue and ruled out by majority opinion, once he has been labelled
as one whose opinions are contrary to those of the group (Nakane,

1970,

33-5). She also argues that an individual, however able, however strong

his personality and high his status, has to compromise with his group's
15

decision, which then develops a life of its
own (Nakane,

Nakane found, Japan is

a

1970,

150). As

society which is heavily based on compromise,

consensus, and harmony. Even after the modernization
and the

comprehensive constitutional and judicial reform by
the occupational
authority, stress on group consensus rather than on
individualism has
remained. Beer described democracy in Japan as
"communitarian feudal

democracy" (Ishida and Kraus, Eds.,

1989,

85).

Democratic notions of constitutionalism, individual rights, and
freedom derived from varied Western sources also became widely
known in Japan in the latter decades of the last century, but
remained subordinate and suspect (Ishida and Kraus., Eds 1989
67)

.

An individualistic rights-consciousness

,

which is

a

basis for American

democracy, appears to be innately incompatible with the Japanese

people’s manner of thinking and social norms. This tradition makes
freedom of expression work differently in Japan as compared with the
U.S. The "public welfare doctrine," which is intimately connected to
the "communitarian" characteristic of Japanese culture, has played a

very influential role in judicial decisions dealing with freedom of
expression.

It

may be said that, because of such

a

doctrine, Japan is

more restrictive with respect to freedom of expression.

D.

It

Freedom of Expression and Regulation of Obscenity in the U.S.

was only after the unlicensed publication in 1644 of John

Milton’s Areopagitica that freedom of information became
16

a part

of the

English tradition. The history of freedom of expression
in the United
States is

a

complex mixture of profound theoretical commitment to

individual liberty and intolerance of dissent and unorthodox views
(Article 19,

1991,

133).

In the U.S.,

freedom of speech had been

guaranteed by the constitutions of some of the states, and in 1791 the
First Amendment to the federal Constitution was adopted.

Gitlow

v.

In the case,

New York (1925), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that freedom of

speech and press was part of the "liberty" that the states may not
abridge. The idea implicit in the First Amendment is that of a

citizenry engaging in robust political debate. However, there are laws

which have restricted freedom of expression including libel, national
security, and obscenity.

Traditionally, American law has used the concept of "obscenity" to
draw the line between prohibited and permitted sexual representations.
The first state obscenity law, proscribing the publication of "lewd or
obscene" material, was enacted in Vermont in 1821; and in

Massachusetts, an unofficial organization, The New England Watch and
Ward Society, kept a constant lookout for possible threats to the

community’s welfare (MacMillan,

1983,

346). A major attempt to restrict

sexually explicit materials in the U.S. arose in the mid-nineteenth

century (Downs and McCoy,

1984,

229). The first reported American

obscenity decision was Commonwealth
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960,

19).

v.

Holmes in Massachusetts

Federal concern with obscenity as

distinct from state concerns, first developed as

a

result of the

growing circulation of French postcards in the mid-nineteenth century.
17

Ihe federal customs law of 1842 barred
the importation of "indecent and

obscene prints, paintings, lithographs, engravings
and transparencies."
However,

the general concern with obscenity in the
pre-Civil War period

was low (MacMillan,

1983,

362),

and the number of prosecutions before

the Civil War were few (MacMillan,

1983,

347). At this time in U.S.

history, obscenity was not an important issue. Basically,

"obscenity"

was not considered an exercise of freedom of expression
(Goldman. 1991.
468). After the Civil War,

the issue of obscenity started attracting

people’s attention. Anti-obscenity sentiment arose and was generated

mainly by conservative political action groups like the New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice founded by Anthony Comstock, who
during the course of

a

forty-year campaign sought to purify American

literature under the banner "MORALS, Not Art or Literature" (MacMillan,
1983,

347). For groups like the New York Society for the Suppression of

Vice,

the fundamental concern was the decay of morality. These groups

focused on the impact of sexually explicit materials on basic societal
and religious values. They urged regulation of representations of sex

which "might" cause sexual arousal. Their underlying belief was that
any public display of sex was harmful because it would undermine moral

values and would endanger the moral climate in society resulting in the

debasement of sex and marriage.
The Comstock Act (1873) prohibited the importation, carriage by
mail, or interstate commerce of every obscene,

indecent,

lewd,

lascivious,

filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance.

"Many states adopted identical or similar ’little Comstock Acts’ of
18

their own and

McCoy, Eds.,

a

number of cities and towns followed suit"
(Downs and

1984,

229). Anthony Comstock succeeded in having
destroyed

"something over fifty tons of vile books; 28,425
pounds of stereotype
plates for printing such books; 3,984,063 obscene
pictures;

negatives for printing such pictures" (Charles

G.

Trumbull, Anthony

Comstock, Fighter (1913) at 239. Quoted in MacMillan,
recently,

in the 1970s and 1980s,

16,900

1983,

347). More

anti-obscenity groups enjoyed

unprecedented growth. Among such groups are, Citizen for DecencyThrough Law (founded in 1957) and Morality in Media (founded in 1962).
The present criteria for obscenity are found in Miller

v.

California (1973). The Miller test was a product of almost two decades
of the Supreme Court’s concern with defining obscenity. To see the

changes in the federal obscenity cases in the U.S.,
at

four cases in Chapter II; Roth

Massachusetts (1966), Stanley

v.

r

v.

C .S.( 1957),

I

will take a look

Memoirs

v.

Georgia (1969), and Miller

California (1973).
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CHAPTER

II

CASES IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

A.

U.S. Obscenity Law Before 1957

Laws prohibiting the sale and distribution of obscene
literature
have existed in the United States since the early part of the

nineteenth century. Until 1957, however, neither those laws nor their
enforcement was taken to implicate the concerns of freedom of speech or
freedom of the press. Obscenity laws were considered to be beyond the

province of the First Amendment; the Supreme Court’s passing statements
to that effect in cases such as Ex Parte Jackson (1878) and Near

v.

Minnesota (1931) were merely restatements of settled understandings
(Hall, Ed.,

1992,

745).

Before Roth, the criteria for obscenity were

based on the test presented in

Regina

v.

Hicklin (1868), whose measure

were on the impact of isolated passages on the susceptible.

States

v.

In United

Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned Hand, in his dissenting

dictum, argued that "(T)o put thought in leash to the average

conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the

necessities of the lowest and least capable seems
(Lockhart and McClure,

1960,

7).

In Chaplinsky v.

a

fatal policy"

New Hampshire (1942),

the Supreme Court held that obscenity is outside the constitutional

protection, because "such utterances are no essential part of any

exposition of ideas" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 9). In Butler

20

v.

Michigan (1956), the Court held
which made it

a

a

Michigan statute unconstitutional,

crime to "publish materials tending to incite
minors to

violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending
to the

corruption of the morals of youth..." (Lockhart and
McClure,

1960,

5).

This last decision indicated the possibility of the
departure from the

Hicklin test.

B.

1.

Roth

v.

United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)

Facts

Roth

v.

U.S. was a prosecution under the federal anti-obscenity

statute, Title 18 Section 1461, making it a crime to distribute obscene

matter through the mails. The appellant, Samuel Roth, was

a

New York

writer and publisher who had been prosecuted in the 1930’s for selling
James Joyce’s Ulysses, Arthur Schnitzler’s Reigen, and Sir Richard

Burton’s translation of The Perfumed Garden. He had himself written
books and articles on travel,

religion, and mysticism, and edited

Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary.
In 1955,

the Federal Government indicted him for distributing some

less illustrious titles

-

Photo and Body, Good Times, and American

Aphrodite Number Thirteen. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, his

conviction was upheld. Roth appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari but limited the question on appeal to whether the
Federal Government could under any circumstances punish the publisher
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:

or seller of obscenity. The core issue
at the Supreme Court was not the

specific book that Roth himself had sold, but
whether or not the
Federal Government could legitimately proscribe
the most obscene

materials imaginable.
To

aid the Court on the last point, the Government
submitted to

the Justices sealed exhibits (which Roth’s lawyer
never saw) consisting

of the most offensive pictures and publications previously
seized and

condemned by the authorites. The use of sealed exhibits in this
way was

unprecedented and probably had

a

substantial effect on the outcome of

the case. Thus, Roth’s lawyers had three serious burdens in the oral

argument

(1) they were fighting against a legal rule that had been firmly
established in almost every society from time immemorial;
(2) they were arguing an abstract question of law with no specific
book or publication to put the problem in a practical context; and
(3) they did not know what horrible examples confronted the
Justices as they considered the problem (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 10).

The lawyers therefore chose a compromise strategy which would allow
some government control of obscenity. They argued that individual

states could punish such publications, but the Federal Government could
not. The First Amendment spoke only to the Federal Government, not the

states, and the broad protection of free speech enunciated there must
be literally interpreted (Friedman, Ed.,

1970,

9-10).

The primary constitutional question in Roth was "whether the
federal obscenity statute violates the provision of the First

Amendment." The federal obscenity statute provided that;

22

Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy
book, pamphlet,
Picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other
publication of an
indecent character; Every written or printed
card, letter,
circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or
notice of any kind
giving information, directly or indirectly, where,

or how, or from
or by what means any of such mentioned matters,
articles, or
things may be obtained or made, ... whether sealed
or unsealed'
...; is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be
conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office
or by any

whom,

letter carrier. Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or
delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable,
or
knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of

circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation
or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both (Grazia, 1969, 290).
There were other questions. One was whether or not this obscenity
statute violates "due process of law". Under the rule of "due process
of law," there must be a clear ground for convicting a crime.

sense,

In this

the clarity of the obscenity law was questionable. Another

question was whether the States solely have the jurisdiction over
punishing speech and press offensive to decency and morality.

2.

Decision: The judgments were affirmed

The decision, which was given on .June 24,

Roth and another case, Alberts

v.

1957,

joined two cases:

California, a state prosecution for

selling obscene publications. In Alberts, the primary question was
"whether the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code invade
the freedoms of speech and press as they may be incorporated in the

liberty protected from state action by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment." The Supreme Court held that the unconditional
23
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phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended
to protect every
utterance. Citing Beauharnais

v.

Illinois (1952), the majority opinion

of the Court argued that obscenity is not within
the area of

constitutionally protected speech.

3.

Discussion

Albrecht, the lawyer on behalf of the appellant, argued that

putting limitations on what can be sent by mail is the function not of
the Federal Government but of the states. The reason for this is that

this is an exercise of state police powers. Further, he posed a

question whether a federal criminal statute can punish speech as
speech, even though that speech has no connection with any action of

Congress over which the Federal Government has power or control. His
argument contended that the federal obscenity statute encroaches upon
the powers to punish speech and press which are reserved to the States
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments was rejected,

since obscenity was

held by the majority not to be expression protected by the First

Amendment
In Roth,

the U.S. Supreme Court held that obscenity is not

expression protected by the First Amendment. The Court argued that
obscenity was outside the protection of speech and press intended by
the First Amendment.

It

declared that there are two classes of speech;

one class is under the protection of the First Amendment, and the other
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IS not.

According to the history of the First Amendment,
the Court

claimed, obscenity belongs to the latter.

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection
of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit
in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity
as

utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for
that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that
obscenityshould be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of
over 50 nations, in obscenity laws of all the 48 States, and in
the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956
(354 U.S. 476, 484-485).

According to the Court’s opinion, the protection by the First Amendment
was "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the

bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"
(354 U.S.

476,

484)

.

Justice Brennan's majority opinion based its conclusion not

only-

on history and precedent but also on the view that, although the First

Amendment protects all ideas with even the slightest social importance
no matter how hateful they may be,

it does not even cover obscenity

because obscenity is by definition "utterly without redeeming social

importance." By holding that obscenity was to be treated as

constitutionally equivalent to conduct rather than speech, the Court
allowed obscenity regulation to proceed without the necessity of the
kind of showing of particular harm normally required for restrictions
on the kinds of speech covered by the First Amendment. Consequently,

although there have long been debates on the effect of sexually
25

explicit material on human conduct, the doctrinal
exclusion of

obscenity from First Amendment coverage made it
unnecessary for the
Court then (or since) to look at these debates
critically (Hall,
746).

1992,

Justice Harlan, dissenting in Roth, questioned the
majority’s

phrasing "redeeming social importance." He pointed out
that the Court
did not indicate the breadth of this term. He asked
whether this

category was meant to include entertainment or artistic works
which
have little relationship to political or social change
(354 U.S. 476,

496-508)

.

The Supreme Court held that obscenity was simply not speech and

therefore could be prohibited. But, the practical problems are how to
define obscenity and how to separate it from protected speech. The

early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged

merely by the depraving and corrupting effect of an isolated excerpt
upon a particularly susceptible audience. This obscenity test was

called the Hicklin test, taken from the English case Regina

v.

Hicklin

(1868). Some American courts adopted this standard, but later decisions

have rejected it and substituted this test; whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards,

the dominant theme

of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The

Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material

legitimately dealing with sex, and so it must be rejected as

unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press. In
the Roth decision,

the Court ruled that this traditional test would no
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longer be appropriate. The Court held that
a work was obscene only if
taken as a whole" it appealed to the "prurient
interest" of "the

average person." In Chapter IV,

I

will examine the key terms employed

by the Supreme Court in its definition of
obscenity.

Even though all of these terms embrace enormous
definitional
problems,

the substitution of "taken as a whole" for the
selected-

excerpts approach and the substitution of "the average person"
for the
most susceptible segment of audience (usually taken to be
children)

were designed to, and did in fact, remove from the threat of the

obscenity laws most works, even those dealing quite explicitly with
sex, whose goal was to convey ideas rather than sexual stimulation

(Hall, Ed.

,

1992,

746)

Jutices Douglas and Black dissented. They believed that neither
the state government nor the Federal Government could punish the sale
or publication of obscene materials. They argued that:

The test by which these convictions were obtained require only the
arousing of sexual thoughts. Yet the arousing of sexual thoughts
and desires happens every day in normal life in dozens of ways...
To allow the State to step in an punish mere speech or publication
that the judge or the jury thinks has an undesirable impact on
thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action is
drastically to curtail the First Amendment (354 U.S. 476, 509).

Justices Douglas and Black took

a

position of protecting society’s

interest in literature, because they believed that the effect of

obscene literature on human conduct should be proven before regulating
expression.
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It was

argued that the statutes in these two eases
did not provide

reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt and
therefore violated the

constitutional requirement of due process. The
Supreme Court, however,
held that the lack of precision was not crucially
offensive to the

requirement of due process. As long as the statutes were
applied in

accordance with the proper standard for judging obscenity,
they did not
offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based
upon

protected material.
Roth remains important both for having established the doctrinal

foundations for the exclusion of obscenity from the coverage of the
First Amendment and for providing the constitutional basis for the

conclusion that the definition of obscenity must be established
primarily on
(Hall,

Ed.,

a

First Amendment basis rather than that of the common law

1992,

746). When Roth was decided,

the proponents of free

expression regarded this decision as negative. However, in the long
run,

the fact that Roth marked a clear departure from the old Hicklin

test meant a lot. This decision provided a cue to renew traditional

American obscenity law. Roth left several issues unresolved.

It did not

clarify what community was to be the basis for contemporary standards.
Another issue was the possible tension between "redeeming social
importance" and appeal to "prurient interest." Whether materials must
evoke perversion, morbidity, or just a normal sexual desire to qualify
as obscene was not made clear (Sunderland,

1974,

51).

As Sunderland

points out, Roth can be read as narrowing "obscenity" to
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a

very limited

group of materials. On the other hand, another
reading might indicate

much more inclusive category (Sunderland,
1974,

51

).

A book named "John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure,

C.

Putnam’s Sons (Intervenor)

v.

a

"

G.P.

Attorney General of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)

1.

Facts

John Cl el and

Fanny Hill

)

s

Memoirs of

a

Woman of Pleasure (otherwise known as

was written and first distributed in England around 1750.

An American edition was published in 1963, and many states immediately

brought obscenity charges against the book. New York State cleared the
work, but both the Massachusetts Superior Court and the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court found it obscene. By

a

four-to-five vote, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that this book was not
entitled to constitutional protection. Overwhelming evidence of its
literary worth was introduced in the case, and attorney Charles Rembar,
in defending the book,

argument (Friedman,

2.

used this testimony to great advantage in oral

1974,

244).

Decision: The judgments were reversed

On March 21,
day,

1966 the Supreme Court decided Memoirs. On the same

the Court handed down the decision in Ginzburg (383 U.S.

Mishkin (383 U.S. 502). The judgment legalized Memoirs by
29

a

463) and

six-to-

three vote. Justice Brennan announced the
judgment of the Court in

which the specific elements of the obscenity
test, which the Court set
in Roth

v.

U.S., were re- formulated

.

Justices Warren and Fortas joined

Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas and Black concurred
in the result the
Court reached, and reaffirmed their position that the
First Amendment

forbids all

limits on speech and press. Justice Stewart concurred
in

that he was against suppression in all three cases, but he
argued that

only hard-core pornography may be suppressed. Justice Harlan again

argued that the First Amendment does not restrict the states the same
way it restricts the national government.

3.

Discussion

Before the state court, the sole question was whether Memoirs

satisfied the test of obscenity established in Roth
The U.S. Supreme Court,

in deciding Memoirs,

v.

United States.

invoked the definition of

obscenity presented in Roth: "Whether to the average person, applying

contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Based on the Roth test,
the Supreme Court argued that the following three elements must

coalesce: it must be established that

(a)

the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to

prurient interest in sex;
the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
a

(b)

30

The point the Supreme Court focused on was
the third criterion, that is
the ’redeeming social value" test. After
hearing various critics

testified,

the majority opinion of the U.S.

Supreme Court held that the

decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
was wrong. The

Massachusetts Supreme Court held the book obscene on the
ground that it
satisfied the "prurient interest test" and the "patent
offensiveness
test." The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, argued
that

must meet all of the three tests

value" test

-

-

a

book

including the "redeeming social

before it is proscribed. Charles Rembar points out that

the Brennan opinion in Memoirs made law of the value theory. The

majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court argued that the
Massachusetts majority was wrong when it held that

a

book did not have

to be unqualifiedly worthless in order to be suppressed. According to

the Brennan opinion,

a

book could not be suppressed if it had any

worth, even if the book is prurient and patently offensive. Charles

Rembar,

in arguing the publisher of Memoirs ’s case before the Supreme

Court, had urged that if qualified critial opinion held that a book had

literary value, it could not be considered legally obscene according to
the Roth decision (Uewis,

1976,

219). Justice Harlan argued that:

To establish social value in the present case, a number of

acknowledged experts in the field of literature testified that
Fanny Hill held a respectable place in serious writing, and unless
such largely uncontradicted testimony is accepted as decisive it
is very hard to see that the "utterly without redeeming social
value" test has any meaning at all (383 U.S. 413, 459).

Justice Douglas also stated that:

31

:

there is to be censorship, the wisdom of
experts on such
matters as literary merit and historical
significance must be
evaluated. On this record, the Court has no
choice but to reverse
the judgment of Massachusetts Supreme Court
If

(383 U.S.

413,

427).

Lewis points out that the opinion of critics had
sometimes been held to
be admissible in a court hearing,

sometimes not, earlier in the

century

Even when judges permitted critical reviews or testimony
to be
introduced, they generally indicated that such opinions were
considered as limited "aids to the court" (Lewis, 1976, 219).
He says that as the result of a long series of events that culminated
in the Roth decision and its subsequent interpretation,

literary authorities indirectly became, for

a

the opinions of

time at least,

the

decisive factor in an obscenity case (Lewis, 1976, 219).
Charles Rembar argued that the meaning of the Memoirs case was
that the decision made writers and their works safe, as long as the

works were something not "utterly without" merit. He claims that
"assuming he can produce something" with merit is "equivalent to

assuming that he is a writer at all." If he has some talent, and if he
is making any effort

to use that talent

-

may have put him (or John Cleland) to work
him... So far as writers are concerned,

whatever springs and urges
-

the law will never bother

there is no longer a law of

obscenity (Rembar, 1968, 490). This is why Charles Rembar gave the
title The End of Obscenity to his book.
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Although no more than three Justices agreed
the social-value test,
uas soon accepted as the official criterion
of obscenity (Lewis.
218)

it

1976,

.

Justice White disagreed the view that the redeeming
social
importance criterion was

a

separate test for obscenity. He argued that:

To say that material within the Roth definition of
obscenity is
nevertheless not obscene if it has some redeeming social value
is
to reject one of the basic propositions of the Roth case that
such material is not protected because it is inherently and

utterly without social value (383 U.S. 413, 461).

He thought the prevailing opinion in Memoirs to be contrary to the Roth

decision that the character of

a

book is dependent on its predominant

theme and not on the existence of minor themes of a different nature.

Justice Clark presented his concern with the increasing flow of

pornographic materials, and said that "(T)his book is too much even for
me... There can be no doubt that the whole purpose of the book is to

arouse the prurient interest" (383 U.S. 413, 441-446). Some of the
expert opinions referred to in Justice Clark’s dissenting opinion

indicate that several such criteria were instrumental in establishing
the "social importance" of Memoirs (Sunderland,

1974,

56).

Lewis points

out that a contention of Judge Spalding of the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court cannot be denied:

The book is composed almost entirely of a series of episodes
involving Lesbianism, voyeurism, prostitution, flagellation,
sexual orgies, masturbation, fellatio, homosexuality, and

defloration (Lewis, 1976, 222).
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Lewis claims that the plot seems an incidental
dramatic frame whose

chief purpose is to support the erotic episodes,
even though literary

critics testified that the novel does have structure,
sharp

characterization, humor, linguistic vigor and style,
and some value as
a

historical record of its period (Lewis, 1976, 222).
Sunderland points

out

that the Brennan,

a test

Fortas, and Warren opinion in Memoirs enunciated

almost diametrically opposed to Hicklin

:

their minority test is this: if an isolated passage of the
material advocates ideas or has literary, scientific, or artistic
value or any other form of importance, then the material is not
In sum,

''utterly without social value," and therefore is protected
(Sunderland, 1974, 56-7).

Indeed, under the Memoirs test, as long as the work has a minimal

social value, it is protected no matter how "offensive" or how much the

material appeals to "prurient interests." As a result, the materials

which are constitutionally obscene are significantly limited. This
point is the target which was attacked in Miller

v.

California (1973).

Justice Stewart presented his idea of limiting suppression to hard
-core pornography. His opinion described hard-core pornography as

a

class of material in which all of the elements being prurient interest,

patent offensiveness and utter absence of social importance (383 U.S.
463,

499). Charles Rembar described this idea as "an amalgam of all

three tests"

(Rembar,

1968,

480). According to this position,

the

presence of value would assure First Amendment protection. Justice

Harlan also argued that he would limit suppression of anti-obscenity
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efforts to hard-core pornography, but he
limited this argument to the
cases in which the federal government is
concerned (383 U.S. 413, 455 460)

.

The Court’s approach in Memoirs

v.

Massachusetts was much more

permissive than in the past cases. However, on the
same day as this

decision was given, the Supreme Court decided Ginzburg

v.

United

States, and stated that the methods of advertising and
selling the

material would be a determinant of judging the presence or
absence of
legal obcenity. This theory of pandering will be addressed
in Chapter
IV.

In sum.

in Memoirs,

the focus was shifted from prurience to the

presence or absence of minimal social value. The criteria set in the

Memoirs remained in effect until 1973 when Miller

v.

California was

decided

D.

Stanley

v.

Georgia, 394 U.S.

557 (1969)

This is one of the last decisions of the Warren Court, and the

Court for the first time gave obscenity some constitutional protection
(Goldman,

1991,

468).

In this case,

the problem of private possession

was involved. The central question was whether or not a man should be

prosecuted for merely owning or keeping an obscene film in his home if
there was no attempt to sell or distribute it.

1.

Facts
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Robert Eli Stanley was under investigation.
With

a

search warrant,

police officers searched his home and looked for
evidence of
bookmaking. However,

they found little evidence.

Instead,

they found

three rolls of 8-mm film. After viewing it, police
officers seized it
on the ground that it was found obscene, and
Stanley was arrested for

possessing obscene material which was illegal under Georgia
statute.
Stanley was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed by
the Georgia
Supreme Court.

Wesley

R.

Asinof,

the lawyer of the appellant,

presented two basic

questions. The first was whether the statute violated the First

Amendment because it punished mere possession of obscene material. The
second was whether the use of language in the statute and in the

indictment to the effect that Stanley reasonably should have known of
the obscene nature of the film permits the state to secure a conviction
for possessing these films without showing actual knowledge on his part

that they were obscene (Friedman,

1970,

309). Asinof ’s argument is that

obscenity in the course of distribution is not protected, but
possession is protected.

2.

Decision: The judgments were reversed

The Stanley case produced rare unanimity in the Court. All nine

Justices voted to reverse. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White did not
address the obscenity issue. These three contended that the material
had been unlawfully seized. The majority opinion, on the other hand,
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was based on the broader ground that
possession of obscenity was

protected by the First Amendment. Justice
Marshall delivered the

opinion of the Court, which held that:

The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime... As we
have said, the
States retain broad power to regulate obscenity;
that power simply
does not extend to mere possession by the individual
in the
privacy of his own home (394 U.S. 557, 568).

3.

Discussion

Stanley was the first case which conferred constitutional
protection on admittedly obscene materials in

a

specific and limited

context. The opinion of the Court in Stanley argued that:

It

is

true that Roth

v. United States (354 U.S. 476) does declare,
seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment... However, neither Roth nor any subsequent
decision of this Court dealt with the precise problem involved in
the present case... Moreover, none of this Court’s decisions
subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private possession of
obscene materials... In this context, we do not believe that this
case can be decided simply by citing Roth (394 U.S. 557, 560-563).

Confronting the argument that "prohibition of possession of obscene
materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting
distribution," the Court argued that there is no difficulty in proving
an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual

distribution. Moreover, the Court claimed that infringement of the

individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases would not be

justified (394 U.S. 557, 567-568).
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The Court argued that the right to receive
information and ideas
is a

right fundamental to our society,

regardless of their social

worth. To support this proposition, it cited
Martin

Struthers (1943), Griswold
General (1965), Pierce

v.

v.

v.

City of

Connecticut (1965), Lamont

v.

Postmaster

Society of Sisters (1925), and Winters

v.

New

York (1948). However, each case is distinguishable
from Stanley. Martin

pertained to the receiving of not pornography but religious
materials.
In Griswold

,

the material involved was birth control information, which

the courts had never regarded as something without "redeeming
social

value." In Pierce, the issue was a statute requiring children to attend
public school.

Winters clearly affirmed that "lewd, indecent, obscene,

or profane" materials are subject to control (Sunderland,

Stanley,

1974,

60).

In

the majority opinion focused on the dimension of "the privacy

of a person’s own home." The Court argued:

He [Stanley]

is asserting the right to read or observe what he
pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to
be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library (394

U.S.

557,

565).

The Court justified its reversal of the judgment by saying;

If the First Amendment means anything,

it

means that a State has

no business telling a man. sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch (394 U.S. 557, 565).

The right to receive information takes on another dimension,

specifically in the context of this case

-

a

prosecution for mere

possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of
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a

person's own

home. The Court argued that the right
to be free from unwanted

governmental intrusions into one’s privacy
is so foundamental that such
an intrusion is allowed under only very
limited circumstances. The

Court cited Justice Brandeis’s dissenting
opinion in Olmstead
(1928),

v.

U.S.

in which he spoke of "the right to be let
alone." The Court

contended that "(W)hatever may be the justifications
for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into
the privacy of
one’s own home" (394 U.S. 557, 565).
In its ruling,

Georgia actually denied the appellant’s rights to

satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs. What Georgia
contended
was that there are certain types of materials that the individual may
not read or even possess. Georgia justified this assertion by arguing
that the films in the present case are obscene. The U.S. Supreme court

attacked this point by arguing:

Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds... And yet, in the
face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia
asserts the right to protect the individual’s mind from the
effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument
amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the
right to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts... it is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment
(394 U.S. 557, 565-566)
.

Georgia asserted that exposure to obscene materials may lead to
deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. The U.S. Supreme

Court rejected this assertion by saying that there appears to be little
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empirical basis for that assertion (394 U.S.
557, 566). The Court

noted

Given the present state of knowledge, the State
may no more
prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on
the ground that is
may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit
possession of
chemistry books on the ground that they may lead
to the
manufacture of homemade spirits (394 U.S. 557, 567).

There exists a conflict between this aspect of Stanley’s
and Roth’s

rejection of the necessity to link obscenity with illegal or
deviant
behavior. Roth rejected this necessity because obscenity is
outside the

protection of the First Amendment. As Sunderland argues, this conflict
may be reduced by recognizing a distinction between the public nature
of the action involved in Roth (and subsequent obscenity cases) and the

private nature of the action involved in Stanley (Sunderland.

1974,

61). The Court argued:

It is true that in Roth this Court rejected the necessity of
proving that exposure to obscene material would create a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce its
recipients to such conduct. But that case dealt with public
distribution of obscene materials and such distribution is subject
to different objections. For example, there is always the danger
that obscene material might fall into the hands of children [See
Ginsberg v. New York (1966)], or that it might intrude upon the
sensibilities or privacy of the general public [See Redrup v. New
York (1967)]. No such dangers are present in this case (394 U.S.

557,

567).

What is distinctive in the decision of Stanley was the fact that
the Court decided that the purely private possession in the home of

even legally obscene material could not be punished. Justice Marshall’s
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opinion is unclear about the basis for this
conclusion. Under one
interpretation, it is based primarily on the
Fourteenth Amendment

restrictions on search and seizure. Under another, it

is based on

freedom of speech and the press. Under still another,
it is based on

a

more broadly premised right of privacy that makes it
impermissible for
the state to restrict conduct affecting no one except
the actor (Hall,
Ed.,

1992,

821-2). Because of its ambiguity, scholars like Sunderland

have criticized Stanley to be "poorly written and neither
closely

reasoned nor adequately supported" (Sunderland, 1974, 68).

Stanley was cited by the Court in various occasions. However, the
Court seemed to be careful in extending its implication. In Twelve

Reels of Film (1973), the majority opinion rejected the assertion that

Stanley created

a right

to acquire or import obscene materials from

another country and restricted Stanley’s application to the explicitly

narrow and precisely delineated privacy right on which that case
rested. The Court also rejected the reasoning that Stanley’s

establishment of the right to possess obscene material in the privacy
of the home "creates a correlative right to receive it,

distribute it." In U.S.

v.

transport it or

Reidel (1971), Justice Harlan expressed the

limited scope of Stanley in this way: Stanley recognized "a right to a

protective zone ensuring the freedom of
or sordid"

(Sunderland,

1974,

61).

a

man’s inner life, be it rich

Justice Douglas, on the other hand,

thought Stanley extended protection to the reading of an "obscene" book
on an airline or bus or train, and to transporting such a book in one’s

baggage (Sunderland,

1974,

58).

In Osborne v.

41

Ohio (1990), Justice

Byron White for the Court held Stanley
inapplicable to private

possession of child pornography and warned that
"Stanley should not be
read too broadly"

E.

1.

(Hall, Ed.,

Miller

v.

1992,

822).

California, 413 U.S.

15

(1973)

Facts

Marvin Miller owned
in California.

a

mail-order pornographic materials business

He sent the advertisements through the mails. These

advertisements consisted primarily of pictures and drawings explicitly
depicting groups of men and women engaging in

a

variety of sexual

activities. One of these brochures was brought to the recipients who
had not requested those materials. They complained to the police, and

Miller was prosecuted for violating the California’s criminal obscenity
statute.

The primary question addressed by the Court was that of

defining the "standards which must be used to identify obscene material
that a State may regulate without infringing the First Amendment"

(Sunderland,

2.

1974,

8).

Decision: Vacated and remanded for further proceedings

Citing Roth

v.

U.S. and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,

the Court

reaffirmed that obscene materials are not protected by the First
Amendment. The Court offered criteria for defining obscenity, which is
now called "the Miller test." Chief Justice Burger delivered the
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.

opinion of the Court, and was joined
by Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. There were
dissenting opinions by Justice

Douglas, and by Justice Brennan with whom
Justices Stewart and Marshall

joined

3.

Discussion

In Miller,

the Court suggested that the essence of obscenity
is

its offensiveness or repulsiveness. One of the most
significant parts

was the

definition of ''pornography." The definition of pornography-

presented by the Court was 'a portrayal of erotic behavior designed
to
arouse sexual excitement." According to the Court in Miller, not every

pornography is "obscene." Besides, not only sexual materials but also
nonsexual materials may be "obscene" (Sunderland, 1974, 8).

Miller was recognized by the Court as

a

re-examination of

standards from previous obscenity opinions (Sunderland, 1974, 8). The
Court structured guidelines for the determination of obscenity,

guidelines which it characterized as rejecting both the plurality
standard of Memoirs, that materials must be "utterly without redeeming
social value," and the "ambiguous concept of ’social importance’"
(Sunderland,

1974,

9).

The criteria set by the Court in Miller were:

whether "the average person, applying contemporary communitystandards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest...;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
(a)

law;

and
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.

(c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious
literary
artistic, political, or scientific
value (413

U.S.

The first criterion,

15,

24).

the "prurient interest" test, was
from Roth and

Memoirs. The Court confirmed that the work
must be judged as a whole.

The meaning of "prurient interest", which
was unclear in Roth and

Memoirs, is not evident In Miller, either.
The second test, the

"patently offensive" test, is basically the same
as the test formulated
in Roth,

but modified. To make the decision clearer,

two examples of

what may be regulated by the states under this part
of the test were
given:

(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals (413 U.S. 15, 25)

Thus,

the Court permits prohibition of specific descriptions of

excretion. On this point, Pilpel argues:

This is really a kind of schizophrenia - presumably specific sex
acts are forbidden because they might be too titillating and lead
to overt and "immoral" behavior; the only comparable fear I can
imagine on which to base the forbidding of specific descriptions
of excretion is that they might lead to too much, or maybe too
little, excretory activity (Downs and McCoy, Eds., 1984, 233).

The Court cited the statutes of Hawaii and Oregon, which it

regarded as acceptably specific provisions. The Court maintained that
the types of materials which may be regulated are confined to a narrow-

category of expressions:
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Inder the holdings announced today,
no one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe
patently offensive "hard-core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by
the regulating state law
as written or construed (413 U.S.
15, 27).
Therefore, it was clearly declared that the
Miller decision grants

constitutional protection to sexual materials unless
those materials
are extreme and depict "hard-core sexual
conduct." The materials are

protected unless they fall within this narrow class.

It

should be noted

that the "patent offensiveness" need not be based
on the work "taken as
a

whole." Apparently, any passages of

a

"patently offensive" character,

no matter how minor a part of the work they constitute,
are sufficient
to meet

this test. The Court did not explain why the words "taken as
a

whole" are not included in the "patent offensiveness" test (Sunderland,
1974,

14).

The third criterion of the Roth and Memoirs test was changed

significantly. Under the Miller test,

material may not be used as
The Court,

in Miller,

a

"socially redeeming value" of

a

defense against a charge of obscenity.

clearly declared that:

We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without
redeeming social value’ test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts ... That

concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three
Justices at one time (413 U.S. 15, 24).

Under the Miller test, patently offensive work which appeals to
prurient interest must have "serious literary, artistic, political, or

scientific value" if it is to be saved from being banned as obscene
(Downs and McCoy, Eds.,

1984,

232).

It
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seems still to be true that a

.

book must fail all three tests to be
held obscene.

It

must appeal to

prurient interest; it must be patently
offensive under current

community standards; and it must lack any
serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific importance.
In sum,

the Miller test considerably narrowed the
range of materials

which are constitutionally defined as obscenity.
Justice Douglas presented his dissenting opinion.
According to
him,

the difficulty of setting the standards of judging
obscenity comes

from the fact that "obscenity" is never mentioned in
the Constitution;

therefore,
that

it

is not a constitutional term.

His basic contention is

the First Amendment does not except obscenity from its
protection

(413 U.S.

15,

40).

Douglas claimed that the Court has failed in

defining obscenity even though it has worked hard (413 U.S.

15,

37).

We deal with highly emotional, not rational questions. To many the
Song of Solomon is obscene. I do not think we, the judges, were
ever given the constitutional power to make definitions of
obscenity (413 U.S. 15, 46)

He argued that the people should debate and decide what they want to

ban as obscene and what standards they want the legislature and the

courts to apply, and that the courts should use these opinions as

guidelines
Four judges

-

Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall

-

disagreed entirely and agreed with each other that "there should be no
ban on obscenity addressed to adults in private." The underlying belief

was that the First and Fourteenth Amendments both prohibit the

46

:

.

government from suppressing materials even
if such materials have
"obscene" contents. They contended that
this is especially true when

distribution of materials involves only
consenting adults. The
dissenting judges contended that the net result
of the majority’s
holding is an almost complete negation of
the right established in the

Stanley case to enjoy obscenity in private. However,
the action
involved in Stanley was private while Miller involved
action which was
public
The

prurient interest'

test and the "patently offensive" test

were used in Roth and Memoirs. In these previous
decisions, it was held
that these tests should be applied in relationship to
"contemporary

community standards." However, it had not been clarified what the
"community" means. The Miller decision rejected the national community
as a basis for the tests. The Court argued that requiring a State to

show violation of a national "community standard" would be futile. This
is because the U.S.
to reasonably expect

is

"simply too big and too diverse" for the Court

that such standards could be articulated for all

50 States in a single formulation (413 U.S.

15,

30). The Court pointed

out the fact that both the prosecution and the defense, during the

trial, assumed that the relevant "community standards" in making the

factual determination of obscenity were those of the State of

California, not some hypothetical standard of the entire United States
of America (413 U.S.

15,

31).

In conclusion,

that
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it was clearly stated

Obscenity is to be determined by applying
"contemporary community
standards" not "national standards"
(413 U.S.

15,

37

)

The Miller decision, of course, reflects
its precedents. For

example, the Court reaffirmed Roth’s thesis
that obscenity is outside
the protection of the First Amendment.
This contention has not changed
at all.

The Court also followed the Memoirs test,
in that it basically

kept relying on both the "prurient interest"
and the "patent

offensiveness" tests as criteria. As

Memoirs

i*as

decisions,

I

mentioned, the third test of

modified substantially. Compared to previous obscenity
the Miller decision was less ambiguous. The Court
declared

that the regulation should be limited to materials
depiciting "hard-

core sexual conduct."

Seven years before Miller, in Memoirs (1966), the Supreme Court

presented significantly permissive standards for the regulation of
obscenity.

In 1970,

the President’s Commission on Obscenity and

Pornography ("The Johnson Commission") presented its report that found
no evidence of a causal link between obscene materials and crime,

sexual deviancy, or juvenile delinquency. The Commission issued

a

recommendation that "federal, state, and local legislation should not
seek to interfere with the rights of adults who wish to do so to read,

obtain, or view explicit sexual material"
99).

(The Obscenity Report,

1971,

American society was becoming increasingly permissive toward

sexual expression during the 1960s and 1970s.

It

is widely known that

"(B)ooks and magazines with words and photographs devoted in whole or
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part to sex and nudity have proliferated
at a greater rate since the
1950s"

(Sobel, Ed.,

1979,

3).

On this social change, Sobel argues

Many Americans have already noted the
changes over the past two
decades that have brought pornography up
from under the counters
of a few furtive newspaper vendors to
favored positions in many
news stalls, from the clandestine
productions of stag-party
impresarios to the seriously reviewed offerings
of the
legitimate" theater, from the sleazy depictions
of sex adventures
filmed hastily in somebody’s apartment to fully
professional
cinematic works produced and directed by motion
picture luminaries
and with serious actors appearing in the
omnipresent "nude scene"
(Sobel, Ed., 1979, 1).

Major growth

of

the pornography industry occurred during this
time. The

number of pornographic magazines available at the newsstands
grew from
zero in 1953 to forty in 1977. Sales of pornographic films in
Los

Angeles alone grew from S15 million in 1969 to S85 million in 1976
(Lederer, Ed.,

1980,

41).

In this sense,

1973 was in the middle of a

time when the commercial exploitation of obscenity was expanding. In
its five obscenity decisions of June 1973,

the Burger Court sought to

redress the balance by empowering local communities to make their own

quality-of-life decision concerning sexually oriented materials.

49

CHAPTER III

CASES IN THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT

A,

The Lady Chatterley’s Lover Deci sion
(1957)

Koyama et al. v. Japan,

1.

11

Keishu No. 3-997

Facts

Ito Hitoshi, who was a prominent novelist, and Koyama
Kyujiro were

charged with violating Article 175 of the Criminal Code by
translating
and publishing D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The
two-part

unexpurgated translation sold well, with about 80,000 copies of the
first volume and 70,000 copies of the second marketed in the spring
and

early summer of 1950. Many authors and newspapers were critical of the
general distribution of the unexpurgated edition but joined the Japan
P.E.N. Club and the Association of Literary Writers in protesting the

indictment.

In an unusual procedure,

the court of first instance, at

the request of both defense and prosecution, allowed the testimony of

twenty-four amateur and professional witnesses as to the alleged

obscenity of the book (Maki, 1964,
On January 28.

1952,

3;

Beer,

1984,

348).

the Tokyo District Court held the work as a

whole not obscene, though it closely resembled pornography in twelve
places. The translator,

Ito,

was aquitted. However, Koyama was

convicted on grounds of salacious advertising, and fined (Maki, 1964,
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3).

The defense appealed on the ground
that the publisher had been

wrongly convicted, and the prosecution
appealed on the ground that
translator also should have been found guilty
(Maki, 1964, 3). On

December 10, 1952, the Tokyo High Court held
that the twelve passages
in Lad y Chatterley’s Lover made it obscene.

I

to was convicted and fined

for having translated and assented to the
publication of the book.

Koyama was also fined (Beer, 1984, 348). Both defense
and prosecution

appealed to the Supreme Court.

2.

Decision: The judgment was affirmed

On March 13,

1957,

the Supreme Court quashed the appeals of Ito

and Koyama while reaffirming the obscenity of Lady Chatterley’s Lover

along lines followed in the high court (Beer, 1984, 348). In its
judgment,

the Court affirmed the definition of obscenity which was

presented in

3.

a

precedent decided in 1951.

Discussion

In the

first part of its ruling,

the Supreme Court examined the

literary content and the theme of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The Court
observed that "(T)he most important themes, which run through the
entire novel, are the primacy of the complete satisfaction of sexual
desire and the philosophy of life that recognizes in love the

perfection of humankind and the significance of human life" (Maki,
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1964,

6). At

least,

the Court recognized that the
central theme of Lady

Chatterley was seriously philosophical.
The Court pointed out that
while the author questioned the conventional
code, morality and concept
of sex,

he was critical of the sexual
tendencies in the new age.

the content of Lady Chatterley and
Lawrence’s introduction,

observed that Lawrence advocated a new sexual
code and

a

From

the Court

morality that

respects the harmony and equality of the spirit
and the flesh. Based on
such an understanding, the Supreme Court confirmed
that Lady Chatterley
LS an

artistic work which is inherently different from
pornography.

Apparently,

the Supreme Court was correct in its interpretation
of the

theme of Lady Chatterley

.

Further, the Court stated that the judgment

of whether the view advocated by the author should
be affirmed is a

question relating to morality, philosophy, religion, and education.
This means that the mere immorality of the idea does not automatically

justify the punishment of the work. The Court argued that "... even
though the conclusion is reached that they are antimoral and
unedifying, it is impossible for that reason alone under existing law
to punish the sale and distribution [of the book]..."

(Maki,

1964,

6).

The question before the Court was not whether Lawrence’s idea is

conventional or unconventional, but whether the elements included in
Lady Chatterley "fall within the purview of ’obscene writing’ of

Article 175 of the Criminal Code" (Maki, 1964, 6). On this question,
the Court presented its unique argument:
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.

the judgment to be made is one
involving the interpretation of
law, namely, that it relates to
a legal value judgment and
is not
a question of determination of fact
(Maki, 1964. 8).

hater, scholars criticized the construction
of this argument. The

Supreme Court contended that the judgment as
to whether the work itself
falls under the heading of Article 175 of
the Criminal Code as an

obscene writing is a problem of the interpretation
of law.

It

is hard

to understand why the judgment of obscenity
is not a factual

determination.
On the appeal that the guarantee of freedom of
expression in

Article 21 of the Constitution is almost unrestricted, the
Court ruled
that the prohibition of obscene literature is compatible with
the

"public welfare

(

Kokyo no Fukushi)" prescribed by Articles

of the Constitution. The Japanese Supreme Court,

12 and

in many occasions,

13

has

used the concept of the 'public welfare" to justify limitation on human
rights. Article 12 states:

The freedom and rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the
people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and
rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the
public

Article 13 states:

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the
extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the

supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental
affairs
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According to the Court’s understanding,
the sale of obscene writings
is
an abuse of Article 21 rights Freedom of expression {Hyogen no
Jiyu)
-

and "contains the danger of inducing
a disregard for sexual morality

and sexual order"

under Article

(Beer,

12 and

1984,

13 of the

348).

It was held that

the aim of law

Constitution is the promotion of the

public welfare," which includes the maintenance
of "the minimum

morality" necessary for social order regarding
sexuality (Beer, 1984,
348)

Counsel Tamaki Shoichi argued that "under the new
Constitution,

which prohibits

system of censorship, whether or not there may be

a

a

violation of the 'public welfare’ must be left to the
independent
judgment of each person" (Maki,

1964,

14).

He also claimed that even if

restriction in the name of the "public welfare" is permissible,
the
basis for deciding permissibility must be clear before the fact
(Maki,
1964,

13).

The Supreme Court responded that the judgment of the

restriction about present case, which was based on the "prevailing
ideas of society

(

Shakai Tsunen

)

"

,

was not unclear. The Court also

argued that the presence or absence of "an offense against the public

welfare must be determined objectively."

means that this judgment is

It

"not something that can be entrusted to the independent judgment of

each person" (Maki, 1964, 14).
Counsel Tamaki Naoya argued that such

a

fundamental human right as

the freedom of expression is "absolutely unrestricted and cannot be

limited even for the public welfare" (Maki,

1964,

14).

On this point,

the Court replied that "the abuse of the rights is prohibited by the
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"

stipulations of Article
14).

12 and

13 of

the Constitution”

(Maki,

1964.

Citing precedents, the Court held that
even those fundamental

human rights stand "under restriction for
the public welfare," and that
these rights are

not absolutely unlimited"

(Maki,

1964,

14

)

it

continued that the protection of a sexual code
and the maintenance of

a

minimum sexual morality are clearly to be
considered parts of the
"public welfare." Counsel Masaki Hiroshi contended
that the present
book is in conformity with the "public welfare"
because it deals with
the problem of sex seriously. The Supreme Court
responded that even

though the translation in the present case is
sincere and its content
is

in accord with the

'public welfare," that does not offset or

dissipate its obscenity.
Counsel Tamaki Shoichi pointed out the prohibition of censorship
and the impossibility of knowing before the fact what is impermissible
in the name of the "public welfare." The Supreme Court’s reply was
that

prohibition of prior censorship does not mean the impossibility of
prohibiting the distribution and sale of obscene literature (Maki,
1964,
"

16).

It

fair notice

did not reply to the question concerning the lack of

.

Despite the opinions questioning the consitutionality of Article
175 of the Criminal Code,

the Supreme Court did not find Article 175

unconstitutional at all. As we can see in the above-mentioned argument
presented by the Court, its decision relied heavily on its belief that
the prohibition of obscene literature under Article 175 is in

55

conformity with the "public welfare;"
therefore, it is constitutional.
The problems of the public welfare
doctrine will be addressed later.
In defining obscenity,

the court first cited prewar and
postwar

precedent. The Court quoted the Great Court
of Cassation's definition
of obscenity in a June 10,

1928 decision (Taishin In, Case No.

1928. Re

1465);

It designates writings, pictures, or
any other objects which
stimulate or arouse sexual desire or could lead
to its
gratification, and, accordingly such obscene objects
necessarily
are those that produce the sense of shame or
disgust in human
beings (Maki, 1964. 6-7).

I

he Court also quoted First Petty Bench decision
(the Sande Goraku

decision) in 1951 saying:

[obscene matter] is that which wantonly stimulates or arouses
sexual desire or offends the normal sense of sexual modesty of
ordinary persons, and is contrary to proper ideas of sexual
.

.

.

morality (Maki, 1964,

7)

The Court added:

In order
wantonly
sense of
morality

for a writing to be obscene, it is required that it
arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal
shame, and run counter to proper concepts of sexual

(Beer,

1984,

It should be noted that

348; Maki,

1964,

7).

the Supreme Court in 1957 unanimously affirmed

the criteria for obscenity which were set in 1951 (Ashibe and

Takahashi, Eds.,

1994,

111).
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.

The Japanese Supreme Court consistently
contended that obscene

literature offends the ordinary person’s
"Sense of Modesty Regarding
Sex"

(

Seiteki Shuchishin; alternatively,

a natural

"the sense of shame"), which is

consequence of the privacy of sex

or "the nonpublic nature of the sex act")

(

Seiko i hikozen no gensoku

(Beer,

1984.

;

348-9). The

majority opinion argued:

As a general rule,

the possession, irrespective of differences
of
civilization, race, clime, and history, of a sense
of shame is a
fundamental characteristic that sets man apart from
the beasts.
Shame, compassion, and reverence are the most
fundamental emotions
that man possesses... These emotions constitute
the foundation of
universal morality... The existence of the sense of shame
is
especially striking in respect to sexual desire (Maki,
1964, 7).

It

was clearly stated that sexual desire itself is not evil, and
that

this instinct is a natural aspect of mankind. However,
that

"human nobility"

(Maki,

1964,

7)

the Court argued

is conscious of a feeling of

revulsion toward sexual desire, and called this feeling "the sense of
shame," which is something universal. Basically, the Court believes
that the sense of shame,

in company with reason,

controls the sexual

desire and entire sexual life of human beings. The sense of shame,

according to the Court, is the main emotional factor which has been

contributing to the maintenance of order and morality in respect to
sex
Next,

the Court extended this argument to explain why obscene

materials are harmful to the society. The Court contended that obscene
material "stimulates and arouses sexual desire and clearly makes known
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the existence of the animal
side of man’s nature," and "it
involves the

sense of shame” (Maki,

1964,

8).

The most curious contention
is coming:

paralyzes conscience in respect to matters
of human sex- it
ignores the restraint of reason; it
comports itself wildly’and
without restraint; and it contains the
danger of inducing a
disregard for sexual morality and sexual
order (Maki, 1964, 8).
It

I

his part of the reasoning is very slippery
and simplistic.

It

is very-

questionable if mere stimulation of sexual desire
"immediately
paralyzes conscience in respect to matters of
sex", and leads

individuals to "ignore the restraint of reason." This
assertion lacks
credibility. The Court should have presented some
reliable evidence of
the causal

relationship between obscene materials and decay of sexual

morality.

Justice Mano presented his opinion criticizing the Court’s
reasoning. He claimed that the Supreme Court erred in using
such

questionable general norms as the sense of shame and the privacy of
sex. On the "non-public nature of the sex act," he argued that doing

sex in public and describing sex in literature are two totally

different things. He contended that the "non-public nature of the sex
act" signifies no more than that the sex act is not performed in public
(Maki,

1964,

19).

As Mano said,

"The translation itself cannot perform

the sex act, either publicly or privately"

(Maki,

1964,

20). Also,

he

pointed out that the description of the sexual scenes in the present

translation does not depict the public performance of the sex act
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(Maki,

1964,

20). As Justice Mano criticized,

the Supreme Court

conflated the actual sex act and mere
depicition of sex.

Another point Justice Mano picked up was
the Court’s contention
that the non-public nature of the sex
act is unchangeable and

universal. According to the Court,

"while prevailing social ideas vary

with time and place, man’s sense of shame
and the privacy of sex are
norms for all but a very few unhealthy societies
and individuals"
(Beer,

1984,

349). The Court held that the judgment of the
presence or

absence of obscenity must be determined in accordance
with "prevailing
ideas of society." By "prevailing ideas of society,"
the Court meant
"the norms of sound men of good sense"
the Court’s understanding,

(Beer,

1984,

349). According to

the prevailing ideas of society "are not the

sum of the understanding of separate individuals and are not

value

of

such understanding;

transcends both" (Maki,

a

mean

they are a collective understanding that

1964,

9).

It

means that standard is not based

on public opinion or on actual prevailing ideas but on the judiciary’s

understanding. The Supreme Court admitted that "prevailing social
ideas" are constantly changing and require modification.

It

recognized

especially that the concepts relating to sex have been changing because
of the wider freedom advocated in contemporary society. However,

the

majority opinion contradictorily contended that "in every society,

it

is recognized that there are norms that must not be overstepped and

that there are norms that must be generally observed"

The Court assigned itself

a

(Maki,

1964,

10).

"clinical role" in maintaining sound

morality. Consequently, if the moral sense of the majority is judged to
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be dulled or changed undesirably,

the Court legitimately exercises
its

power to correct it. Scholars criticized
this claim by the Court which

practically declared that the judgment of what
the prevailing ideas are
is under the jurisdiction of judges.

Justice Mano questioned the

legitimacy of this contention by the Court.
Mano claimed that the

mission of the judge is "to interpret and to
apply the law honestly,
dispassionately, and impartially," and that "this
is the proper and
most important attitude for the judge to take"
(Maki,

1964,

23).

The Court’s arrogation to itself of a clinical
role was sharply

criticized by Japanese scholars, and did not appear in
the de Sade

decision in 1969. However, the relationship between the
courts and

morality has not been completely resolved. Current interpretation
of
Article 175 of the Criminal Code is based on the belief that

maintenance of the minimum morality is in the public interest, which
should be protected by the judiciary.

In Chatterley

,

the Supreme Court

recognized that law is "not burdened with the duty to maintain all

morality and good customs," but it still argued:

Law incorporates into itself only "the minimum morality," namely,
the morality which alone possesses a considerable significance for
the maintenance for the social order it is designed to achieve.

What each provision of the Criminal Code mentions as a crime is,
in short, something that can be recognized as a type of conduct in
violation of this minimum morality (Maki, 1964, 8).

The Supreme Court in Chatterley took a position that other values
do not mitigate the obscene nature of the work. The Court acknowledged
that Lady Chatterley’s Lover involved serious criticisms of
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industrialization, economics, traditional
class-based society, and
human nature.

It

also clearly declared that the
translation of Lady

Chatterley cannot be recognized as pornography.
Pornography, according
to the Court's understanding,

qualities" (Maki,

1964,

11).

is what is

"largely lacking in artistic

Lady Chatterley

,

on the other hand, has

significant artistic qualities. However, Lady
Chatterley was held to be
obscene because the passages noted disregard
the normal sense of shame
and morality by wanton appeal to passion (Beer,
be noted that the Court,

in this judgment,

1984,

349).

It

should

focused on the separate

individual passages rather than on the work taken
as a whole. The

majority opinion contended that the work’s artistic or
literary value
does not reduce the work’s obscene nature. The Court did
not compare
the social value and the harm which the work may bring.
Under the

Court

s

logic,

it

is also impossible to make such a comparison,

because

the Court believed that legal and moral judgment is different
from and

irrelevant to artistic judgment. Even if Lawrence’s book is a work of
art,

the determination of its artistic or literary value is outside the

court’s responsibility.

We cannot approve the principle of the supremacy art, which
emphasizes only the artistic nature of a composition and rejects
criticism from the standpoint of law and morality. Even though a
composition may have high artistic merit, it does not necessarily
follow that its obscene nature is thereby dissipated. Though it be
art, it has no right to present obscene matters publicly. The

artist,

too, in the pursuit to his mission must respect both the
sense of shame and moral law and he must not act contrary to the
duties borne by the people at large (Maki, 1964, 11-12).
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:

To take artistic and literary value into
consideration does not

necessarily mean "the principle of the supremacy
of art."

It

is

questionable if it is reasonable to discard an
artistic or literarywork without examining its other social value,
when the work’s value is
recognized by the court itself. Such an emphasis on
morality seems
rather like "the principle of the supremacy of
morality."
The Japanese Supreme Court totally dismissed
the argument of the

appeal that the translation in the present case is not
obscene because
of

the absence of evil intent.

deemed present,
existed,'
1984,

It was held

that criminal intent was

because the appellants knew the twelve passages

and "were aware of the book’s distribution and sale"

(Beer,

348). The court cited Article 38-3 of the Criminal Code which

reads

An ignorance of the law cannot be deemed to constitute a lack of
intention to commit a crime, but punishment may be reduced
according to circumstances (Beer, 1984, 359).

According to the Supreme Court, to establish criminal intent under
Article 175 of the Criminal Code, the recognition by the parties that
the writing is obscene is not required. Also,

it was held that

sincerity of publishers is irrelevant to the presence or absence of
obscenity. Later, Koyama confessed what he originally intended in

publishing Lady Chatterley. He said that he, as a publisher, wanted to

disseminate a correct knowledge, thought, and philosophy about sex in
the era when the widespread distribution of gross sexual materials were

going on. He and Ito chose Lady Chatterley, since it was the
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masterpiece of Lawrence who dedicated his life
to the questions
surrounding sex (Higuchi, Ed.,

1985,

73).

The Supreme Court contended

that neither the seriousness of its
treatment of the problem of sex nor
the sincerity of the accused should affect
the court’s decision. Not

only rejecting the presence or absence of
criminal intent, the Court
also refused to take any surrounding context into
consideration in

judging the obscenity of Lady Chatterley. In the Tokyo
District Court,
it was

argued that the selling method of Lady Chatterley
made this work

obscene, even though the work itself was not obscene.
This theory is
what

is

called

pandering" in the U.S. The Japanese Supreme Court

rejected this theory.
In the Chatterley decision,
is obscenity?'

the focus was on the question;

"What

As the first case in which the constitutionality of

Article 175 and its relationship with Artilce 21 of the Constitution
were argued,

this decision meant a lot. Sakamoto summarizes the

significance of Chatterley as follows. First of all, it should be noted
that the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the

three criteria for obscenity which were presented in a past case

decided in the Petty Bench six years before. Second is the Supreme

Court’s understanding that the judgment of the degree of sexual

stimulation and offensiveness is not a judgment of facts but a legal
value judgment. Moreover, the Court contended that the standard of such
a judgment should be based on

"prevailing ideas of society," which do

not mean a sum of the ideas held by each individual. This formulation
is curious.

Third,

it was

clearly held by the Supreme Court that
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obscenity
1994,

111

is

).

against the "public welfare" (Ashibe
and Takahashi

,

Eds..

The Chatterley decision was criticized
by many scholars,

and later cases revised its ruling.

In particular,

the Court’s

paternalistic stance and underlying legal
moralism have been attacked.
Scholars have questioned the legitimacy of
the Court’s way of using the
"public welfare” doctrine. Sakamoto argues
that the maintenance of

sexual order and minimum sexual morality cannot
be regarded as the
"public welfare”

(Ashibe and Takahashi, Eds.,

1994,

111). Even if the

maintenance of sexual order constitutes the "public
welfare," the Court
should have examined whether Article 175 of the Criminal
Code is the
least restrictive alternative in pursuing this aim.

In Chatterley,

the

Court endorsed the constitutionality of Article 175 of
the Criminal
Code, just by arguing that Article 175 is a provision to
protect a

sound sexual order.

In this judgment,

the Court failed to distinguish

the regulation of obscene action in public, which is prescribed
in

Artice 174 of the Criminal Code, and the regulation of obscene
expression.

B.

The Marquis de Sade Decision (1969)

Ishii et al. v. Japan,

1.

23 Keishu No. 10-1239

Facts

In 1959 and

1960,

an abridged translation (one-third) of Marquis

de Sade’s In Praise of Vice (Akutoku no Sakae) was published in two
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volumes. The second part of this work,
The Travels of Juliette
(

Juliette no Henreki

)

was alleged to contain fourteen obscene

descriptions. Shibusawa Tatsuo,

Ishn Kyoji

,

a

French specialist translator, and

the publisher, were indicted for the sale
(about 2,500

copies) and possession for sale (about 290
copies) of obscene writings
(Beer,

1984,

349).

On October 16,

1962,

the Tokyo District Court acquitted the

accused. The court did not mention any Constitutional
questions, and
just followed the Chatter ley doctrine in noting three
conditions for
the establishment of obscenity under Article 175 of
the Criminal Code:
1)

wanton appeal to sexual passion;

sense of shame; and

3)

2)

offense to the average man’s

opposition to proper concepts of sexual

morality. The court found The Travels of Juliette not obscene, because
the extremely grotesque and brutal depictions and unreality preclude

fulfillment of the first condition. However, the second and the third

conditions were deemed present. On this decision, the prosecution
argued that the three conditions for establishing obscenity are not

independent from each other, and therefore that the work in question is

obscene since it satisfies the second and the third conditions, and
since it specifically violates "the principle of the nonpublic nature
of the sex act." On November 21,

1963,

the Tokyo High Court reversed

the decision of the Tokyo District Court, and held the work to be

obscene. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that

a

work is

obscene because it violates "the principle of the nonpublic nature of
the sex act." The basic difference between the district court and the
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high court was that the latter held that
all three conditions for

establishing obscenity were met, and fined
Shibusawa and Ishii. The
accused appealed to the Supreme Court, contending
that this judgment
erred in interpreting and applying Article 175
of the Criminal Code and

violated Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution in
holding In Praise of
Vice to be obscene literature first by differentiating
between the

dimensions of obscenity and artistry or intellectuality
in

a

literary

work, and then by making a work the object of criminal
action for

obscenity under Article 175 of the Criminal Code even if it is
of high
artistic and intellectual value (Ito and Beer, 1978, 184).

2.

Decision: The judgment was affirmed

On October 15,

1969,

the Supreme Court quashed the appeal in an

eight-to- five decision. The Court maintained the position taken in the

Chatter ley decision, which basically held that

a

work can be judged as

obscene even if it contains artistic or other values, and that the

regulation of obscenity is compatible with the "public welfare" of the
nation.

3.

Discussion

Just like the Court in Chatterley twelve years before, the Supreme

Court held that the moral and legal dimensions are distinct from the

artistic and intellectual dimensions of a literary work, and argued
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that the court’s responsibility is
"not to pass judgment on the

presence or absence of its artistic and
intellectual merits in
themselves" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 185). It
declared that the task of the

courts is to determine the presence or absence
of obscenity solely in
the legal sense. An argument existed which
contended that "in

determining the presence or absence of
interests damaged by obscenity in

a

a

crime of obscenity,

legal

written work should be balanced

against its public benefits as an artistic intellectual
writing, on

analogy with a legal principle used in relation to crimes
of
defamation" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

185). The Court clearly rejected this

theory. The Supreme Court contended that "it is not impossible
to

consider obscenity and artistry or ideas as distinct dimensions of
work and to judge obscene in its moral and legal aspects

a

a

work that is

artistic and intellectual" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 184). This means that
it

is

time.

possible for a work to be held artistic and obscene at the same
In this part of the reasoning,

the Court followed the the logic

of the Chatterley decision. The Court rejected the arguments which hold
that "works with artistic and intellectual value cannot be liable to

punishment as obscene writings" (Ito and Beer.

1978,

184).

What was new in the de Sade decision was that the Court recognized
the possibility that the artistic or intellectual elements of the work

affect the degree of obscenity. The key passage in the majority’s

reasoning was:

There may be cases where the artistry and intellectual content of
a work may diminish and moderate the sexual stimulus caused by its
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portrayal of sex to a degree less than
that which is the object of
punishment in the Criminal Code, so as
to negate the work’s'
obscenity; but as long as obscenity is
not thus negated, even a
work with artistic and intellectual
values cannot escape treatment
as obscene writing
I to and Beer,
1978, 184-5;
(

In
of

its decision,

Beer,

1984.

350).

the Supreme Court clearly declared that
freedom

expression under Article 21 and academic freedom
under Article 23 of

the Constitution are "extremely important
as foundations of democracy"

(Ito and Beer,

1978,

186),

but it followed the Chatterley decision’s

understanding of the limitation on these freedoms. The
Court argued
that these freedoms are not absolute or without
limits,

that their

abuse is forbidden, and that they are placed under
limitations for the
"public welfare." Therefore,

the Court claimed that penalizing the

distribution and sale of artistic obscene writings for

a

sound social

order is not contrary to Article 21 or 23 of the Constitution.
Rather,
the Court held that it would be beneficial to "uphold order
and healthy

customs in sexual life" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 186), which is part of the
"public welfare" of the whole nation. This argument is identical with
that in Chatterley. The Court argued for the maintenance of a sound

sexual order, but it never discussed the question of "whether or not a

certain degree or frequency of exposure to obscene material has any
positive or negative empirical relationship to such matters as sex
crime rates or the development of respect for the dignity and beauty of

human sexuality" (Beer, 1984, 353).
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Justice Irokawa agreed with the majority
opinion in that freedom
of expression is necessarily limited in
several cases. However, he

contended that:

Ue must strictly avoid an attitude which
casually uses the
abstract notion of the public welfare and cuts
down on freedom of
expression with great dispatch (Ito and Beer,
1978, 214).

This argument was a solid criticism of the majority
opinion, which made
no reference to what the public welfare is in
this case. Another

criticism was presented by Justice Tanaka, who argued:

The majority’s definition of obscenity is acceptable, if
degrees
of obscenity and the relativity of the "ordinary person
standard"
are recognized; but the court’s customary way of interpreting the
public welfare and freedom is fundamentally in error (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 214; Beer, 1984, 351).

The Supreme Court held, as had the original judgment, that

"fourteen passages in Juliette are too boldly candid in portraying
sexual conduct, are lacking in human feeling, unrealistic, fanciful,
and are joined with scenes of ugly brutality"

(Beer,

1984,

350). The

Court acknowledged that Juliette is different from pornography because
of these characteristics and its intent,

but held that "it suffices

wantonly to stimulate and arouse sexual passion in the ordinary person"
(Ito and Beer,

1978,

186). Therefore, Juliette was found obscene.

In the Tokyo High Court,

part in a work,

it was held that

if there is one obscene

that part makes the work as a whole obscene.

In

determining the presence or absence of obscenity, the Supreme Court
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argued that individual passages must
be judged not in isolation but
in
relation to the whole work of which they
are integral parts. It should
be noted

that this argument was something that
could not be found in

the Chatter ley decision.

However, the Court also argued that:

There is no reason to consider it improper
to judge the presence
or absence of obscenity in a specific
passage when that judgment
is made in connection with the whole
work (Ito
and Beer,

1978,

Based on this logic, the Court held the entire
book obscene since

fourteen sections of Juliette are obscene (Beer,
1984, 350).
Chief Justice Yokota questioned the obscenity of the
work, in his

dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justice
Osumi. Yokota
argued that the fourteen passages in question are "weak in
obscene

emotion" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

198):

The obscenity of the fourteen passages (10 percent of the book),
which graphically portray debauchery, sodomy, bestiality, and

unnatural love, is diminished beyond the critical point by
contiguous sections depicting such behavior as flagellation,
torture, and killing by fire, as well as by the sharp social
criticism and ideas of the rest of the book (Beer, 1984, 351).

Just like Justice Yokota, Justice Tanaka did not find the work in

question obscene, because "its contents are generally vacuous,
unrealistic, and abnormal,

they are portrayed as continuous with cruel

and revolting scenes before and after, and they give rise to a strong

sense of loathing in the general reader rather than to obscene
feelings" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

210).

70

Because of these portrayals,

Tanaka claimed, its obscenity is
diminished significantly. Justice
Irokawa also claimed that

a

thorough reading of Juliette might

literally sicken, rather than sexually
stimulate, the general reader
(Beer,

1984,

351).

On the other hand, Justice Okuno, in
his dissenting opinion,

argued that the obscenity of Juliette was
fostered, rather than

diminished or erased, by the relationship between
the fourteen passages
and the scenes of brutality (Ito and Beer,

1978,

201).

The Supreme Court rejected the contention that
the book’s effect
on readers should be considered.

In its judgment,

the Court argued that

under present law, the judges are charged not with
assessing readers’

impressions of the book at issue but with determining whether
or not

a

work is possessed of obscenity, according to the "prevailing
ideas of
society, man’s sense of shame, and the privacy of sex" (Ito and
Beer,
1978,

188;

Beer,

1984). According to the Court,

the impression of the

general reader is nothing more than just a reference. Just like the
Court in the Chatterley decision,

the Court placed the standard of

judgment on the "prevailing ideas of society." However, the normative

characteristic of the "prevailing ideas of society," which was
presented in Chatterley, was not very evident in the de Sade decision.
The appellants contended that facts of such matters as the methods
of publishing and selling writings, and the scope,

the degree and the

classes of people in the readership, the attitude of authors, and other

matters forming the premises for judgment concerning the obscenity of
the work were not investigated. Therefore,

71

they argued that "the

judgment concerning obscenity is not
based on lawful evidence and does
not follow proper procedures,
and thus violates Articles 31 and
37 of
the Constitution"

(Ito and Beer,

to this argument by saying that

1978.

189). The Supreme Court replied

the Court

'does not adopt a position

based on a relativistic notion of
obscenity in judging obscenity in
this case" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

189). The Court also argued that this

case is an instance "in which the judgment
of first instance

established the existence of the facts constituting
the crime" (Ito and
Beer,

1978,

189),

and that the Supreme Court in such a case
does not

need further fact-finding to hold a judgment.

Justice Tanaka pointed out that the majority in the
present case
seems to acknowlege the relativity of the concept
of obscenity by

saying that "the literary and intellectual content of
a book may

diminish its obscene effects to a point where illegal
obscenity is not
present.
However,

This argument was what the Chattarley decision rejected.
the Court rejected the relativity of societal values and
the

role of literary values in judicial determinations regarding
obscenity.

Justice Tanaka claimed that the Court’s position on this point is
confused and ambiguous (Ito and Beer, 1978, 206-10; Beer, 1984, 352).
The effect on an obscenity judgment of salacious advertising was
not clear from the majority opinions in de Sade (Beer,

1984,

353).

Moreover, the question of protection of youth was argued only in

Justice Iwata’s opinion (Beer,

1984,

353).

Justice Irokawa argued that

examination of surrounding circumstances such as the method of
publication, distribution, and sales, the format of the printing, and
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the methods of promotion and
advertising is necessary.

In his

dissenting opinion, he claimed that:

t

is

reasonable to

regulate salacious advertising, or
publication
of obscene extracts from a work
otherwise recognized for its
social value (Ito and Beer, 1978,
215; Beer, 1984, 351).

There were six separate opinions. Each
of them had distinctive
elements, but one similarity between them was
that each one proposed to
judge obscenity by taking other values into
consideration.

Justice Iwata, who presented

separate opinion, agreed with the

a

conclusion of the majority opinion that artistically,
intellectually,
or academically valuable works can be judged
obscene at the same time.
He acknowledged the obscenity of the fourteen
passages in question, and

agreed with the majority in that Juliette is obscene under
Article 175
of the Criminal Code. Yet,

he contended that it is wrong to make the

distribution, sale, and public display of the works

a

crime without

examining the methods and manner of their publication, and other

circumstances (Ito and Beer, 1978,

194).

Iwata’s opinion stressed the

academic, historical, scientific, intellectual, and/or literary values
of Juliette

.

He contended that the proper interpretive method was to

balance the legal benefits of regulating obscenity against the social

values of the work as

a

whole (Beer,

1984,

351). He proposed the

comparative consideration of the legal interests:

When the benefit to society (public interest) from publication of
those writings is greater than the legal interests infringed upon
due to obscenity, then the publication of those writings for the
sake of that benefit to society (public interest), as a
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justifiable act under Article 35 of the
Criminal Code, does not
constitute obscenity (Ito and Beer, 1978,
195).

After pointing out the necessity of examining
these conditions,
however, Justice Iwata agreed with the
conclusion that the publication
of this book should be penalized under
Article 175. He pointed out that

this work was published and sold with the
aim of general distribution,
that the fourteen passages in question graphically
describe sex scenes
in lewd and concrete detail,

and that such a work is "harmful to a

proper sense of modesty regarding sex, and is contrary to
healthy

concepts of sexual morality" (Ito and Beer, 1978, 196). His
conclusion
was that "the benefits accruing to society from the publication
and

sale of this book are not sufficient to compensate completely for
the

above harmful effects" (Ito and Beer, 1978,

196).

Justice Yokota stressed the intellectual value of the work by

contending that Marquis de Sade, in this work, speaks "his unique
thought and philosophy concerning the laws of nature, or politics and
religion" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

197).

Yokota pointed out that de Sade

attacked both Christian civilization and the enlightenment thought

originated from naive progressivism

.

To challenge optimism about human

nature, de Sade tried to reveal the darker sides of human nature and

hidden dimensions of social order, religion, and morals. Further,
Yokota claimed that de Sade’s writings’

"revolutionary ideas and their

utopian ideas continue to be accorded great importance in the field of
the history of social thought,

in the area of medical science and

psychology, and in intellectual and artistic movements that emerged in
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the present century,

Beer,

1978,

such as surrealism and existentialism"
(Ito and

200).

Moreover, Justice Yokota considered
it inappropriate to penalize
the acts of the accused, even if
the translation of Juliette is

obscene:

Even if a book is obscene, penalties
under Article 175 infringe
upon freedom of expression if excision of
the obscene sections
detracts from the literary and intellectual
value of the whole
work (Ito and Beer, 1978, 198; Beer,
1984,

351).

He proposed to consider the matter of
priority in each case. According
to

\

okota

,

a

problem is "how to adjust the demand that
distribution and

other acts regarding obscene writings not be
permitted, with the
demands of freedom of expression with respect to writings
with

intellectual value and the like" (Ito and Beer, 1978,
199). To

determine the priority, he argued, it is necessary to examine
the
degree of obscenity.

If a work contains passages with strong obscenity,

priority should be given to the demands of controlling obscenity
over
the demands of distributing the work even with artistic and

intellectual values.

If, on balance, the degree of obscenity found, even though not
great, is more important to the substance of a work than its
artistic and thought content, its sale may be restricted (Ito and
Beer, 1978, 199; Beer, 1984, 351).

Justice Yokota complained that the majority opinion undervalues the
demands of freedom of expression under Article 21 of the Constitution.
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As cited already,

he contended that the
obscenity in this case is
weak,

and that "obscene passages
in the translation at
issue are less
important than the passages
with intellectual and
artistic value" (Ito
and Beer, 1978, 201,.
Therefore, in the present
case, he proposed to
give priority to freedom
of expression rather than
to the demand of
regulating the distribution
of the work.

Like the majority and several
other judges. Justice Okuno

acknowledged that the obscene,
artistic, intellectual, and
literary
elements are not always mutually
exclusive, and these can be
just
different dimensions of one work.
Justice Okuno. like Justice Yokota,
proposed comparative consideration
of priority over legal interests
in
each case. His key contention
is as follows:

In such

cases, to fix one’s attention only
on the aspect of
obscenity in that work, to forbid
its publication and sale, and to
punish contrary acts, is to deprive
people in general of their
right to receive the artistic,
intellectual, and literary values
of that work, and to violate the
freedom of expression of the
author (Ito and Beer, 1978, 201-2).

He pointed out that, under Article
230-2 of the Criminal Code,

speech may escape punishment if the
facts in

a

libelous

case indicate the speech

at issue touches the public interest
and was uttered

for public

benefit. Okuno contended:

This legal principle is a generally appropriate
basis for
Transcending Legal Provisions and Negating Illegality
(Chohokiteki
Iho Sokyaku) whenever an alleged offense
involves an exercise of
freedom of expression that has public value (Ito
and Beer, 1978
202; Beer, 1984, 351).
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He argued that the Supreme Court
completely ignored the artistic,

intellectual, and literary value of the work
in question, and looked

solely for obscenity without any consideration
or judgment of the
work's public nature (Ito and Beer,

1978,

202). Justice Okuno concluded

that punitive measures were inappropriate
if the various elements of

Juliette were weighed (ito and Beer,

1978,

201-2; Beer, 351).

Similarly, Justice Tanaka contended that the work
is of high artistic
and intellectual value. He also pointed out that
it was not found that
the translator and the publisher intended to
translate and sell this

work with a specific emphasis on the point of its
obscenity (Ito and
Beer,

1978,
It was

210).
in de Sade that the "hard-core pornography only" policy was

presented for the first time in the Japanese Supreme Court. In his

dissenting opinion, Justice Irokawa tried to clarify what obscenity is,
and what pornography is. He divided obscene writings into two kinds.

The first is pornographic writings which are "indecent writings for the
sake of indecency intended solely to arouse sexual interest" (Ito and
Beer,

1978,

211)

Beer,

1978,

211). The second category is the writings which take "sex

and which have "no redeeming social value"

(Ito and

as its subject matter and includes descriptions of sexual activities"

(Ito and Beer,

1978,

211),

but does not stand "on the basis of arousing

sensual and lascivious preoccupation and interest" (Ito and Beer, 1978,
211). Justice Irokawa agreed with the prohibition of distribution and

sale of the first category, because pornography "will contribute to the

decay and degradation of a sound order in society regarding sex" (Ito
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and Beer,
to take a

1978,

211). Concerning the second category,

Irokawa proposed

very careful comparative consideration
of the values, because

he recognized a close relationship
between a nation’s culture and the

freedom to write, disseminate, and receive
literature, ideas, and

information. He argued that we must be extremely
cautious about

restricting free speech and free press (Ito
and Beer, 1978, 214).
Accordingly, he contended that punitive measures
under Article 175 of
the Criminal Code are proper only in the
cases of extreme pornography.

Justice Irokawa found that there are portrayals of
sexual activities in
this book which are unnecessarily explicit. However,
he also argued
that

the translation in the present case does not
stimulate or arouse

sexual desire, and concluded that it is an error to hold
this work to
be obscene (Ito and Beer,

1978,

217).

fhe concept of "freedom to know" was presented by Justice
Irokawa
in his dissenting opinion.

He contended that freedom of expression

under Article 21 of the Constitution includes freedom of speech and
press, and the freedom to know.

Irokawa argued that "freedom of

expression is meaningless without the freedom to read, listen, and
see," and that "the freedom to appreciate a literary work and receive
its values must be fully respected along with the freedom to publish,

distribute, and so on" (Ito and Beer,

1978,

213):

Even if the distribution of such works have some undesirable
affect on the order in society regarding sex, the distribution
should not be penalized under Article 175 of the Criminal Code as
long as there is substantial social value in publishing that work
and letting it be appreciated (Ito and Beer, 1978, 213).
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.

Justice Tanaka, who dissented from
the majority’s judgment,

emphasized the extreme importance of
freedom of expression in
democracy.

He contended that

freedom of expression and academic

freedom are absolute. However, Justice
Tanaka clearly acknowledged that
there are intrinsic limitations on
these freedoms. He argued that, in
these cases, only "inherent limits

(

naizaiteki seiyaku)" on freedom are

intended by the Constitution. It means that
the exercise of freedom
must reflect respect for the freedom of
others and recognition of the

existence of different individuals’ freedom.
According to Tanaka's
opinion, punishment under law for libel or for
distribution and sale of

obscene writings should arise only from judicial
recognition of acts
that are in themselves contrary to the inherent
limits of freedom.
In Chatterley,

eleven judges agreed in affirming the original

judgment, and only two judges presented separate opinions.

In de Sade,

on the other hand, six judges presented their individual
opinions, and

each of them had some distinctive point. This is the most
fundamental

difference between these two decisions. This fact itself may mean that
there was a significant change in prevailing ideas of society during a

period of twelve years, with respect to sexual representation. Beer
points out that the fundamental difference between the majority and the

dissenting Justices in de Sade is in the interpretive methodologies
(Beer,

1984,

352). The majority,

like the Chatterley court

,

based its

judgment on analytic correlation of Article 175, the public welfare,

prevailing ideas of society, and the fourteen objectionable passages in

Juliette

The dissenters and Justice Iwata emphasized the balancing of
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relevant public Interests and direct
recourse to the Constitution’s
stress on freedom. The former see
obscene parts as casting

a

shadow

over the whole, while the latter
see the possibility of the brightness
of the whole dispelling the shadow
cast by the obscene sections.
The ruling by the Supreme Court
basically followed the logic

presented in Chatterley, but there were
some substantial changes. Beer
points out:

The majority view went beyond Chatterley
doctrine in more clearlystating that obscene sections render an entire
work obscene;
recognizing the possibility of literary writings
close to but less
than obscene; applying the public welfare
standard to academic
freedom for the first time (Beer, 1984, 350).
As

I

mentioned already, one more change from Chatterley
was that the

Supreme Court in de Sade proposed to judge the work’s
obscenity in
relation to the whole work. However, the Court did not
present any

concrete method of judging obscenity.

C.

The Yojohan Decision (1980)

Nosaka et al. v, Japan and Nakagawa et al. v. Japan, 34 Keishu No. 6-433

1.

Facts

In 1972,

the story Yojohan Fusuma no Shitabari, which was

supposedly written by the famous writer Nagai Kafu, was printed in July
edition of a magazine Omoshiro Hanbun. In June, 28,458 copies of the

magazine were sold. The publisher, Nakagawa, and the chief editor,
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”

Nosaka, were accused of illegal
distribution of obscene material under

Article 175 of the Criminal Code. Two
thirds of this story was occupied
by explicit descriptions of
intercourse in a geisha house.

On April 27,

obscene.

1976,

the Tokyo District Court held Yojohan
to be

In its judgment,

the court followed the Chatterley
doctrine.

The court argued that the sales of such
sexually explicit material as
the work in question violate "the
principle of the nonpublic nature of
the sex," and that violation of this
basic principle also disturbs the

sexual order and the sexual morality of a
society. The court affirmed

previous decisions in its understanding of the meaning
of "obscenity"
under Article 1/5 of the Criminal Code and the
criteria for judging the

presence or absence of obscenity. Three conditions for
"negating

illegality

(

ihosei sokyaku)

were presented:

The sincere objective of the work;
2) A legitimate selling method; and
3) The interest which the sale of the material brings to a society
outweighs the harm which was caused by the sale of the material.
1)

However, the court denied "Negating Illegality" in this case (Ashibe
and Takahashi, Eds.,

1994,

114). On March 20,

1979,

the Tokyo High

Court again affirmed the constitutionality of Article 175 of the

Criminal Code. However, its reasoning was different from the Tokyo
District Court’s decision. The court followed the precedents in the

understanding of the meaning of "obscenity," but

it made

the standard

and method of judging the presence or absence of obscenity more

concrete. The court set three criteria for obscenity:

81

1) Description of the genitals
or the sexual acts is bold,
detailed, concrete, and appealing to
readers' emotion and
sensation;
2) The dominant effect of the work
as a whole appeals to prurient
interests in readers; and

According to the prevailing ideas of society,
the work is
judged as offensive (Ashibe and Takahashi,

3)

Eds.,

1994

,

114

).

As the elements which should be taken
into consideration in judging the

dominant effect of the work, the court presented
such elements as the

proportion of the work taken up with above mentioned
sexual
descriptions, the relationship between such descriptions
and the
thought expressed in the work, and the effect of
the work’s serious

societal value which may sublimate or overcome the sexual
excitement.
I

he Tokyo High Court’s ruling did something more
than just follow

precedent

.

The court proposed a method of judging obscenity which is

more detailed compared to its precedents. The accused appealed
to the

Supreme Court, arguing the unconstitutionality of Article 175 of the
Criminal Code (Ashibe and Takahashi, Eds.,

2.

1994,

114).

Decision: The judgment was affirmed

On November 28,

1980,

the Supreme Court held Yojohan to be

obscene. The Court followed three criteria for obscenity set by

Chatterley. The constitutionality of Article 175 in its relation to

Article 21 of the Constitution was affirmed again. The Court reached
this decision just by following the previous two decisions. There was
an argument contending that Article 175 is so vague that it constitutes
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violation of Article 31 of the
Constitution. The Court rejected this
argument by saying that this article
is not unclear. The Supreme
Court
a

agreed with the Tokyo High Court’s
decision in that the presence or

absence of obscenity must be judged by
assessing the work as

a

whole.

After examining Yojohan as a whole,
the Supreme Court found it to meet
the three criteria for obscenity under
Article 175 of the Constitution.

3.

Discussion

The Supreme Court in the Yojohan decision
basically followed the

formulation set in Chatterley and affirmed in de
Sade. The three basic

criteria for obscenity were left intact. However, the
Supreme Court in
Yojohan appeared to pursue more clarity and objectiveness
in judging

obscenity. This is probably because the Court acknowledged
the fact

scholars had criticized Chatterley and de Sade for the vagueness
of
their criteria for criminal obscenity.
The fundamental question that the courts must answer in the

present case,

the justices held, was whether or not a work "appeals

primarily to prurient interests in readers." In de Sade

,

the Court held

that the judgment of obscenity must be made by assessing a work as a

whole. This argument was presented in de Sade for the first time, but
the de Sade Court did not mention "how" such an assessment should be

made practically.

In

Yojohan,

the Supreme Court presented five elements

which should be examined in determination of the presence or absence of
"appeal to prurient interests." The concept of "prurient interest" was
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not presented at the Supreme
Court before

Yojohan. Concerning the

elements which should be considered,
the Supreme Court followed
the
idea presented by the Tokyo High
Court.

The relative boldness, detail,
and general style of its
description of sexual behavior;
2) The proportion of the work taken
up with sexual description;
d) The relationship in a
literary work between such descriptions
and the intellectual content of the
story;
1.)

-1)
The degree to which artistry and thought
content mitigate the
sexual excitement induced by the writing;
and
5) The relationship of sexual portrayals
to the structure and
unfolding of the story (Beer, 1984,
353).

in

de Sade

question.

,

In

the Supreme Court focused on the theme of
the work in

Yojohan, on the other hand,

the Court’s focus shifted from

the theme to the descriptions contained in
the work.

The Court used the term "prevailing ideas of society,"
but did not

mention the meaning of this term. The Court simply followed
the ruling
made 23 years before, which argued that the "non-public
nature of the
sex act" is at the core of prevailing ideas of society. Given
the great

transformation of society between 1957 and 1980, the Supreme Court
should have at least addressed this issue.

In 1983,

Justice Ito

presented his opinion that "prevailing ideas of society" should be
flexibly determined in accordance with social change. With this
argument,

Ito rejected the validity of the principle of the "non-public

nature of the sex act" (Ashibe and Takahshi, Eds., 1994, 115).

It

should be noted that the arguments discarding the element of "contrary
to proper ideas of sexual morality" can be observed in several
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lower

courts recently (Oya,

1981, 60). Moreover,

lower courts began

presenting the argument that "prevailing
ideas of society’ should
reflect the existing social reality
rather than the normative standard
of the judiciary (Oya,
it

is still difficult

1981,

60 and 62).

However, Oya points out that

to judge and establish solid
standards reflecting

the social reality. He concludes that
"prevailing ideas of society"

cannot be an appropriate standard of judging
obscenity (Oya. 1981. 60).
It

is observed

that both the Tokyo High Court and the
Supreme

Court in Yojdhan aimed to limit the regulation
of obscenity to "hardcore pornography" and materials close to
this category. Yet,

the

precise standard of "hard-core pornography" was
not fixed in Yojdhan.
Later, on March

8,

1983,

the Supreme Court was faced this question.

In

his supplementary opinion, Justice Ito argued
that the crucial

criterion for "hard-core pornography" is the absence of
any redeeming
social value. On the judgment of obscenity of "pseudo
hard-core

pornography," he proposed to examine comparatively the work’s harm
and
social value. Also, he claimed that such

a

comparative examination

needs to be done with a special cautiousness in the cases involving

works with political, academic, or artistic value. However, critics

contend that the harm of sexual expression has not been specified, and
that the social value of the work is not the object of judicial

determination but something the audience should determine (Ashibe and
Takahashi, Eds.,

1994,

115). There has been a contention that "it is

easy to distinguish pornography from others, even if it is hard to

define it legally" (Oya,

1981,

62). Another claim often taken for
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granted is that '’there is

a

consensus on regulating public display
of

hard-core pornography" (Oya, 1981,
62). However, to limit the
regulation of obscenity to "hard-core
pornography" may not be as easy
as usually assumed.

The

1

ojohan decision loosened the restriction
of obscenity, on the

one hand, and made the criteria for
Article 175 of the Criminal Code

more concrete and clearer, on the other
hand (Oya,

1981,

60). However,

there is disagreement concerning the
assessment of this decision.

Scholars like Kitani regard this ruling as
important, while other
scholars like Matsui do not evaluate it
positively. The latter points
out

the fact that the Court did not change the
basic definition of or

criteria for obscenity (Oya, 1981, 57 note 2). In
Yojohan, the question
of the constitutionality of Article 175 was
not discussed at all. The

issue of the "public welfare" was not addressed. The
legitimacy of the

selling method was argued at the Tokyo District Court, but
it was not

a

focus of the decision at the Supreme Court. The criminal
intent or

other subjective factors on the side of the writer and publisher
were
not examined,

either. Largely because it was decided at the Petty Bench

of the Supreme Court,

the

Yojohan Court was under limitations set by

the previous two decisions at the Grand Bench.

In avoiding conflict

with its precedents, the Yojohan decision lacked thoroughness. The

discussion as

a

whole stayed very shallow. The social transformation

between 1957 and 1980 should have been reflected in the decision or at
least in the discussion at the Supreme Court.

It

is even strange that

the Supreme Court persistently kept the guidelines which were set more
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than two decades before, as if
they were unquestionably correct.
Yet
there was some important development
in YojShaa. The most
significant

advance in this decision was that
the Supreme Court made the method
of
judging obscenity less ambiguous
by presenting the elements which
should be examined in making

a

judgment.
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CHAPTER IV

THE THEORIES AND STANDARDS OF
REGULATING OBSCENITY

In this chapter,

I

will address the basic theories of
regulating

obscenity and the terms used in judicial
decisions from the U.S. and
Japan discussed in the last chapter.

In the first part,

the theories

developed in the U.S. will be addressed. Some
of the theories were
employed in Japanese cases, while some others
were not. In the second
part,

I

will examine and compare the standards of
obscenity and the

terms used by the American and Japanese courts.

A.

1.

Theories

The Bad Tendency Test

This test was prevalent in the earlier days of the discussion

concerning the First Amendment. Under this doctrine, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gitlow

v.

New York

(

1925)

stated;

That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace, is not open to question (Emerson,
1963,

50).

In this decision,

the Court was practically saying,

"the legislature

was entitled to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
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indled the flame or

blazed into conflagration" (Emerson,

1963,

50).

The "bad tendency" test renders
freedom of expression nothing, since

freedom of expression receives no
protection whenever there is any

confiict between expression and other
social interests. The crucial

problem of this test is that it allows only
expression which is
harmless to the Establishment. The standard
of "bad tendency" can be

ideologically biased. Once such subjectivity
is allowed, what comes
next

is

totalitarianism in the area of expression. The
"bad tendency"

test was rejected by the Court in Dennis
51 note 6).

However,

v.

U.S.

(1951)

(Emerson,

1963,

the Court’s wording in Git low seems very
similar

to the traditional Japanese Court’s argument.

In Japan,

such an

emphasis on the 'public welfare" and public morals
remains prevalent in
the courts,

2.

even though it has been criticized by Japanese academics.

The Clear and Present Danger Test

The "clear and present danger" test was presented by Justice

Holmes in Schenck

v.

U.S.

(1919):

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive

evils that Congress has a right to prevent (Emerson, 1963, 51).

Originally, Justice Holmes presented this argument in order to justify
the regulation of expression. Later,

however,

this test was used to

protect freedom of expression, and has been regarded as an advancement
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from the "bad tendency" test.
The "clear and present danger"
test

protects expression even though that
expression is in conflict with
other social interests. This test
was employed by the majority of
the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1940s,
and then abandoned by the Court
in

Dennls (1951) decislon

*

According to Emerson, there were five
major

objections to this test. First, the "clear
and present danger" test’s
focus on effectiveness of the expression
in influencing action is

incompatible with the doctrine of free
expression under the First
Amendment. Second, this test is very vague.
Third, this test often
involves difficult factual judgments which
the court is inherently

unable to make. Fourth, the "clear and present
danger" test was

originally adopted in the cases where

a direct

prohibition of

expression by criminal or similar sanctions was involved.

It

is

questionable if this test is applicable to other kinds of
cases. Fifth,
the

clear and present danger" test was expanded to include
other

factors than the immediate impact of expression in influencing
action.
As a result,

the difference between the "clear and present danger"
test

and the ad hoc balancing test became insignificant (Emerson,
3).

At the beginning of the 1950s,

1963,

51-

the "clear and present danger" test

was abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court. Emerson points out that "(T)he

substitute

-

the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability

-

excised the main features of the original test by eliminating or

minimizing the requirement that the danger be immediate and clear"
(Emerson,

1963,

53).

In this sense,

the "clear and present danger" test

became the "clear and possible danger" test. The "clear and present
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danger" test reemerged as the
"clear and imminent danger" test
in
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and is now
a firm part of the First

Amendment law.

In Japan,

the "clear and present danger'
test has been

broadly supported among academics.
There are a significant number of
local

legislations and judicial decisions which
adopted this standard

(Sone,

3.

1985,

22).

The Ad Hoc Balancing Test

The ad hoc balancing test is that "the
court must in each case

balance the individual and social interest in
freedom of expresson
against the social interest sought by the
regulation which restricts

expression" (Emerson,

1963,

53-4). This test, presented by Chief

Justice Vinson in American Communication Association

v.

Douds (1950),

has been adopted by the Supreme Court in a number
of subsequent

decisions. Basically, this method does not present

a

fixed standard of

judgment. Emerson argues that the principal difficulty with
this test
is that

it

frames the issues in a very broad and undefined way, which

is almost unstructured.

of law (Emerson,

First,

1963,

Therefore, it can hardly be described as
54).

a

rule

Five major criticisms are as follows.

the ad hoc balancing test presents no substantial doctrine which

guides a court in reaching its decision. Second, this test involves
factual determinations which are not only very difficult and time-

consuming but also improper for the judicial process. Third, the ad hoc
balancing test deprives the judiciary of its independent judgment, and
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gives more power to the legislature.
Fourth, the ad hoc balancing test
makes the First Amendment insignificant.
Under this test, the

restriction of expression is within the
legislature’s discretion. The
courts can restrain the legislature only
when the judgment itself is

unreasonable. For this, the First Amendment
is not necessary, because
the due process clause can achieve the
same degree of protection.

Fifth,

this test lacks advance notice of the rights
essential to be

protected. Ultimate decision is always left to
the resolution in each

case (Emerson,
the attempt

1963,

54-6). The ad hoc balancing test is a product
of

to reconcile the

conflicting interests surrounding free

expression. However, this test cannot offer any stable
and reliable
legal guideline for regulating expression. Under this
test, it is very-

hard for individuals to know whether or not a certain
expression is to
be protected,

until the expression actually comes up for discussion in

the court. Such unpredictability is

a

serious defect of this method,

because it lacks "a fair notice.” In the Japanese Supreme Court,

Justice Okuno and Justice Iwata claimed to use this test in the de Sade

decision (1969). Also, the Japanese Supreme Court, in the Hakata

Station Film decision (1969), unanimously agreed to employ this test.

4.

The Two-Uevel Theory of Free Speech

In deciding cases involving the First Amendment,

the U.S. Supreme

Court has focused on the social utility of expression. In Chaplinsky

v.

New Hampshire (1942), the Court argued that obscenity falls outside the
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category of speech protected under the
First Amendment. What the Court
meant was that there are two categories
of speech; one is protected
under the First Amendment, and the other
is not. Fifteen years later,
in Roth v.

U.

5.(1957)

,

the Court endorsed this theory,

it

was held that

"(A) 11 ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance

-

unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the

prevailing climate of opinion" are protected
against governmental
restraint. Obscenity, on the other hand,

is

"utterly without redeeming

social importance." The Court quoted Chap 1 insky and
concluded that

obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech
or press (315 U.S.
is

571-572). The majority’s opinion argued that it

568,

unnecessary to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear and

present danger,

since obscenity is not in the area of constitutionally

protected speech. In his article "The Metaphysics of the Law of

Obscenity," Kalven questions the legitimacy of the two-level theory of
free speech as a doctrine, and claims that this theory seems difficult
to accept as a doctrine.

He criticizes the Court’s usage of this theory

as "a strained effort to trap a problem"

(Kalven,

1960,

10-11).

According to the two-level speech theory, there are two categories of
communications. The communications of the first category are entitled
to be tested under the

"clear and present danger" test, even if they

are against majority opinion of the time or hated by majority. On the

other hand, the communications of the second category are so worthless
that no extensive judicial examination is necessary before prohibiting

them (Kalven,

1960,

11).

Under this theory, the Court must only decide
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if a work belongs to the first
or the second category of speech.
Once

the work is judged to belong to
the second category,

there is no need

for the Court to bother to
consider the presence or absence of
danger.

The expressions in the second category
are to be banned not because
they are dangerous but because they
are worthless. On this two- level

theory of free speech, Justice Harlan, in
his dissenting opinion in
R°th,
a

criticized that "(T)he Court seems to assume
that ’obscenity’ is

peculiar genus of ’speech and press,’ which
is as distinct,

recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy is
among other plants,"
and pointed out the difficulty in using the
two-level theory where

classification at the first or second level depends on

a

key term as

vague as obscenity (Kalven, 1960, 20).
However,

it has not been really proved that certain
sexually

explicit materials, which are held "obscene" by the courts,
always lack
worth and utility. Kalven says,

"In the process of defining obscenity,

the Court said nothing about social worthlessness"

(Kalven,

1960,

15).

On this issue of social utility, Kalven contends that the Court "has

confined itself on each occasion to the historical point that libel and

obscenity have long been regarded as worthless speech subjected to
prohibition" (Kalven,

1960,

12).

He refers to Gitlow

v.

New York (1925)

and argues that "the question ... would be about the social utility of

revolutionary speech and not the utility of the particular pamphlet"
(Kalven,

1960,

materials,

too.

11).

This comment is applicable to sexually explicit

Even if the depiction is very unorthodox or even

contrary to the conventional morality, "(I)t is the premises and not
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s

the conclusion that are worth
protecting"

sense,

(Kalven,

i960,

the work of de Sade and Lady
Chatterley’s Lover

,

ll).

in this

in Japanese

Supreme Court cases, should have been
considered seriously, since their

premises were

a

serious attack on the conventional moral
framework

itself.
For a long time,

the courts have asked what the social
utility of

obscenity is, and have reached the conclusion
that obscenity is
worthless expression. On this point, Kalven
claims that the problem
lies in the way the question has been put.
He argues:

seems hardly fair to ask: what is the social utility
of
obscenity? Rather the question is: what is the social
utility of
excessively candid and explicit discussions of sex? (Kalven
It

1960

12

)

This criticism is sound. Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme
Court has

dismissed certain sexually explicit materials as not worth
protecting,
just by saving obscenity lacks redeeming value. However, as Kalven

points out,

the real question was "(W)hat is the social utility of

sexually explicit materials?" There are various objectionable exercises
of speech,

but it does not immediately mean that they are necessarily

and totally worthless and useless.

criteria for obscenity

-

In this sense,

"Taken as a whole,

one of Miller

the work lacks serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific values"
as an independent requirement.

In Japan,

'

-

should be taken

such an element as the

artistic and/or literary value of the work was treated as totally
irrelevant to the judgment of presence or absence of obscenity in the

Chatterley decision. In the de Sade decision, the Court admitted the
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possibility that these values make
the work exempt from obscenity
charges. In the Yojohan decision,
the Court decided to take
these
elements into consideration.
However, even if certain expression
lacks social utility or

redeeming value, does it automatically
mean that it is outside the

protection of the First Amendment? Does
expression have to have social
utility or worth in order to be protected
by the First Amendment? Under
the two-level speech theory,

"(l)„ determining the constitutionality
of

any ban on a communication, the first
question is whether
a category that has any social utility"

(Kalven,

Amendment itself never mentions social utility
as

I960,
a

It

belongs to

11). The First

premise of its

protection.
In his book,

Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Go vernment

(1960), Meiklejohn argues that free speech is indispensable
to the

informed citizenry required to make democratic
self-government work.
The people need free speech because they vote. As

a

result, his

argument distinguishes sharply between public and private speech.
This
theory explains why communications relevant to the political
process
should be guaranteed, but it does not explain why the novel, the poem,
the painting,

the drama,

or the piece of sculpture falls within the

protection of the First Amendment (Kalven, 1960,

16).

Kalven points out

that the majority opinion in Roth has made a major contribution in the

sense it showed

a

shift from Hicklin. However, he criticizes it as

unsatisfactory, because "it gave a major endorsement to the two-level
theory that may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free
96

.

speech generally- (Kalven,
1960,

17).

David A.J. Richards argues that

attempts to regulate the contents
of communications by law are

incompatible with the principle of
equal liberty (Richards, 1980, 101
2). According to him, the First
Amendment

rests on a moral basis that

cannot be reduced to "a utilitarian
calculus of the political

usefulness of
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a

debate on divergent points of view"
(Richards,

1980,

)

"Constant Obscenity" and "Variable Obscenity"

5.

On the concept of obscenity,
the issue is

there are two basic positions. Here,

"whether obscenity is an inherent chracteristic
of obscene

material, so that material categorized as obscene
is always obscene at
all
a

times and places and in all circumstances, or
whether obscenity is

chameleonic quality of material that changes with time,
place, and

circumstance" (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 68). These two

conceptualizations are respectively called "constant obscenity" and
’’variable obscenity." Lockhart and McClure, who question
the validity

of the concept of "constant obscenity," find it difficult to draw
a
line between non-obscene materials and the material that is obscene

though not hard-core pornography (Lockhart and McClure,

1960,

75).

They

pose other questions:

What is to be done about material, indisputably hard-core
pornography, that is addressed to an audience of social scientists
for purely scientific purposes? What, if anything, is to be done
about the panderer who pushes non-obscene material as if it were
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to
7

And although the general
JUUXXL cannot constitutionally
be denied UePeS!
tn nnn-nKcnnnA

k

Si

aissemination
ure,

Given the difficulty of fixing

a

i960,

76)

satisfactory test fo r materials which

are placed somewhere between Lady
Chatterley’s Lover and hard-core

pornography, they contend that "the United
States Supreme Court
might well decide to hold the line for
constant obscenity at the level
of hard core pornography"

(Lockhart and McClure,

1960,

76). After they

point out the defects of setting a
"constant" concept of obscenity,

Lockhart and McClure advocate a "variable"
concept of obscenity, which
would make the validity of censorship depend
upon the particular

material’s primary audience and upon the nature
of the appeal to that
audience. They argue that, since there is no such
thing as inherently

obscene literature, materials must be judged by their
appeal to and
effect upon the audience to which they are directed
(Clor,

1969,

118).

Lockhart and McClure quote D.H. Lawrence’s words saying
"(G)enuine

pornography is almost always underground; it doesn’t come into the
open," and argue that:

Given the nature and appeal of hard-core pornography, it is clear
that the proper hypothetical person to use in testing material of
this kind is not the average or normal person but rather the
sexually immature who wallow in the hard-core pornography to
satisfy their immature craving for erotic daydreams (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 74).
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inder the concept of variable
obscenity, material is judged by
its
appeal to and effect upon the
audience to which the material is

primarily directed. In this view,
material is never inherently obscene;
instead,

its obscenity varies with the
circumstances of its

dissemination (Lockhart and McClure,
1960, 77). The Supreme Court did
not adopt a concept of variable
obscenity in Roth. In Roth Justice
,

Warren argued for the possibility that
"(A) wholly different result
might be reached in a different
setting"
(Lockhart and McClure,

68),
v.

but

this argument was ignored.

31 Photographs

,

1960,

In the Kinsey Institute case

(U.S.

1957), a federal district court adopted
the concept

of variable obscenity and ruled that
hard-core pornography, imported
from abroad by the Kinsey Institute for
scientific study, was not

obscene (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 70). In
Japan, the courts adopted
the concept of variable obscenity in some
instances.

case (1969),

In the de Sade

the Tokyo High Court held that when the readers
are

limited to a certain group of people, the standard of
judging obscenity-

should be placed at the average of that group rather than
the average
of the general population. The concept of variable
obscenity is not

perfect, either. First of all, it is questionable whether
judges and/or

juries can determine the impact of the material on a specific audience.
For example, how can judges know what the readers feel after reading
the material in question? Second,

obscenity,

it

is

according to this conception of

unpredictable whether or not

be judged obscene. As a result,

a

certain expression will

there would be chilling effect on

expression.
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6.

Pandering

in

the debate over the obscenity
provisions of the Model Penal

Code, Henry Hart urged that the
criminal offense of disseminating

obscene material be defined as pandering
to an interest in obscenity.
The American Law Institute rejected
Hart’s proposal because of its

difficulty of enforcement (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 69). The
pandering test, however, was introduced
in Ginzburg
Supreme Court held that

a

v.

U.S.

(1966). The

publication appealing to the public’s

prurient interest in sex and advertised as
such may be deemed obscene,

although the material, standing alone, is
not obscene under the Roth
test or even under the Memoirs test.
Under this theory, a book may be

obscene depending on its prospective purchasers
and the method of

distributing and advertising it. Various contexual
elements are
considered in determining whether or not a material
is obscene (Ringel,
1970.

112-3). This approach was also suggested by Justice
Brennan in

Memoirs.

In Japan,

the Tokyo District Court presented this theory in

the Chatterley case. The court found Lady Chatterley
to be close to.

yet different from, pornography. However,

the court held that the

salacious way of advertisement made it something akin to pornography.

B.

Next,

I

Criteria for Obscenity

will examine the teminology that both Supreme Courts have

used in their obscenity decisions. Some of the terms are overlapping,
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and some of them sound similar
but differ in their actual
meaning.

chose the terms which

1.

I

I

think crucial in deciding
obscenity cases.

"Average,” "Normal,” or "Ordinary”
Person

Intil Roth,
Iiicklin

(

the standard of obscenity was
that held in Regina v.

1868) and determined by the affects on
"those whose minds are

open to such immoral influences.” One
of the most criticized aspects of
the old Hicklin test for obscenity
was its reference to particularly

susceptible persons as the standard for judging
material alleged to be
obscene (Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 70). Even
though the court
followed the Hicklin test, in U.S.

v.

Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned

Hand argued that the Hicklin test would
"reduce our treatment of sex to
the standard of a child’s library in the
supposed interest of a

salacious few” (Kalven, 1960, 6). In this same decision,
Judge Learned
Hand said,

"I

scarcely think

...

that society is prepared to accept for

its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary
to the weakest
of

its members'

(Lockhart and McClure,

1960,

110). This argument was an

indication of the possibility of negating the Hicklin test. In Butler
v.

Michigan (1956),

"(T)he Court was saying that the average adult is

not merely the preferred test audience for materials distributed

generally; it is the constitutionally required test audience" (Kalven,
1960,

7).

In Roth,

finally,

the Court revised the standard for judging

obscenity. What the Court made clear was that material must be judged
by its effect on the "average" or "normal" person instead of the weak
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and immature. However, it
is not clear at all who
is average, normal,
or ordinary. In a totalitarian
society, the government may set
some

arbitrary criteria to define "a
normal person." Similarly, in

a

theocracy, it was easy to distinguish
heretic and deviant.

In a liberal
democracy, however, diversity among
individuals is supposed to be

respected. Most people think of
themselves as normal and average in

modern Japanese and American societies.
As

a

result,

it

is very-

difficult to say what is normal or
abnormal.
Lockhart and McClure argue that any
concept of the "average" or
"normal" person cannot be fully satisfactory.
The Massachusetts’s

formulation of the "average" person as

a

composite representing all

elements of society including the young and
susceptible retains the

restrictiveness of the Hicklin test (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 72).
On the other hand,

the concept of "average" person as the common
man,

or the man in the street is also problematic.

Another question concerning the validity of the "average"
person
test concerns the judgment of obscenity in hard-core
pornography.

Lockhart and McClure argue that the prurient interest of the
"average"

person cannot be the legitimate test of obscenity in the cases of
hardcore pornography, because

hard core pornography appeals to the sexually immature because it
feeds their craving for erotic fantasy; to the normal, sexually
mature person it is repulsive, not attractive (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 72).
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Lockhart and McClure conclude
that reference to the "average”
or normal
person was just an expression
of disapproval of the
"particularly
susceptible persons" test. As
they point out, if the concept
of
variable obscenity is accepted,
the concept of the average
or normal

person has little place (Lockhart
and McClure,
It

1960,

78).

seems that the U.S. Supreme
Court employed the term "according

contemporary community standards" in
order to modify the defects in
the concept of the "average"
person. In Japan, the Supreme Court
has
to

used wording similar to "average"
person;

"the normal sense of sexual

modesty of ordinary persons." The
Japanese Supreme Court, on the other
hand,

has not added anything to make the
concept of "normal" clearer.

Instead,

the Court has argued that

"the prevailing ideas of society"

should be the criteria of judgment.

2.

"Contemporary Community Standards" (the U.S.)
and "Prevailing Ideas

of Society"

(Japan)

In Roth (1957),

the U.S. Supreme Court held that the presence or

absence of obscenity may be judged by the application
of "contemporary-

community standards." In Smith

v.

California (1959), Justice

Frankfurter argued:

The determination of obscenity is for juror or judge, not on the
basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection on the
particular experience of life, but on the basis of contemporary
community standards (Ringel, 1970, 96).
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The national standards test
was adopted in such cases as
Excellent

Publications Inc.
In Jacobellis v.

v.

U.S.( 1962) and State v. Hudson
County News (1963).

Ohio (1964),

the Court held that the term

"contemporary community standards" must
not be interpreted in a
parochial sense, but is to be equated
with the contemporary community

standards of the nation as

a

whole, since the area of expression
that

is protected is governed by the
Federal Constitution (Ringel,

1970,

102-3). The logic of the proponents
of the national standards test is

that the First Amendment rights must
be applied equally to all the

states just because those rights are

a

part of the Federal

Constitution. The American Law Institute, although

a

bit ambiguous,

favored national community standard by arguing
that "since

a

large part

of the responsibility in this area has been
assumed by the national

government enoforcing federal obscenity legislation,

a

country-wide

approach is almost unavoidable" (Lockhart and McClure,
1960, 111
footnote 601).
community'

In Hudson v.

U.S.

(1967),

the Court held that the term

used in Jacobellis refers to the nation as a whole, not to

the local community. The Court argued that the national
scale must be

taken because the meaning of the term "obscenity" is not intended to

vary from place to place (Ringel, 1970, 104).
The adoption of a national standards test was criticized, because
it

"takes away from the individual states their right to deal with

their local problems.

It

tends to centralize in the federal government

the power to control criminal prosecutions in the respective states"

(Ringel,

1970,

109).

In Wisconsin,

in McCauley v.
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Tropic of Cancer

(1963),
in

the statewide test was
adopted. The California Supreme
Court,

In Re Giannini

(

1968), argued that

in the event of further
prosecutions,

"(Dn order

to provide guidance

however, we hold that the trial

judge correctly ruled that the
relevant community is the State
of
California- (Ringel, 1970, 103). This
case, In Re Giannini, however,
was a case which involved
"topless" dancing in a nightclub.
It was not
a case which involved publication
of books or motion pictures.

The most crucial deficiency of
the national standard lies in the
fact

that its application was almost
unworkable,

because of diversity

among states across the U.S. This is
why it was rejected in Miller

California (1973), as we saw in Chapter

II.

However,

focus on a very

narrow geographic area does not necessarily
make it easier to find

standard for obscenity. Douglas Wallace
conducted

a

v.

a

survey of 1083

adult volunteers from the Detroit Metropolitan
Area to find out if
there was a reliable "community standard"
for evaluating a series of

erotic pictures. What Wallace found was

a

considerable amount of

variability in response to both the attitude items
and the erotic
stimuli,

but he says that

this is not a great surprise given the

heterogeneity with respect to age, education, religion,
religiosity,
sex and sexual attitudes. Wallace claims:

While it may be possible to find or construct a small group
of
individuals who will totally agree with each other in their
evaluation of visual erotica, on the dimensions relevant to the
concept of legal obscenity the probability that such a consensus
will be obtained will decrease in a nonlinear manner as the size
of the group increases linearly (Wallace,
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1973,

66).

.

Wallace found no uniform standard
or criterion being used by
subjects
as they evaluated the stimulus
items. His findings did not
support the
single contemporary community
standard hypothesis. He concluded
that

the

social

issue of obscenity ultimately
reduces itself to one of

individual differences" (Wallace,
1S73, 67).
Lockhart and McClure conclude that
the phrase "contemporary

community standards" have little
place in obscenity eases, and that
his
wording was used by the Court just
to express its disapproval of the

application of the Victorian standards in
the Hicklin test (Lockhart
and McClure,

1960

,

113)

On the question as to who should
determine what is obscene, D.H.

Lawrence contends:

We have to leave everything to the majority,
everything to the
majority, everything to the mob, the mob,
the mob. They know what
is obscene and what isn’t, they do. If
the lower ten million
doesn t know better than the upper ten men, then
there’s something

wrong with mathematics. Take a vote on it! Show
hands, and prove
it

by count!

(Downs, Ed.,

1960,

171).

Lawrence’s claim points out the basic rule of democracy.
In Japan,
however,

there appears that "there’s something wrong with mathematics."

In judging obscenity,

the Japanese Supreme Court repeatedly held that

such a judgment has to be in accordance with "the prevailing ideas
of

society." This term sounds very similar to the term "contemporary-

community standards" in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, but these
two are different. According to the Japanese Supreme Court’s

understanding,

"the prevailing ideas of society" are "not the sum of
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:

the understanding of
separate individuals and are
not a mean value of

sueh understanding”

(The Chatterle, decision;
eited in Maki,

1964.

9).

The Court clearly declared
that ”(T)he judgment of what
the prevailing
ideas of society are is. under
our present system, entrusted
to judges"
(Maki,

1964,

9).

There is no law which states
that such

judgment is

a

entrusted to judges. The Court’s
contention presupposes that judges
surety know what ideas are
prevailing among the "mob" in the
current
society. It may be assumed that
the Japanese Supreme Court is
saying
basically that "the upper fifteen men Justices - know better than the
lower one hundred twenty million."
If the upper fifteen men know
better
than the lower one hundred twenty
million,

there is no place for

democracy. This attitude of the Japanese
Supreme Court represents the

judiciary's arrogance. Also.

I

believe that one difference between the

l.S. and Japan shapes the Japanese
Court's attitude. What the U.S.

and Japan does not is a jury system.
Judge Learned Hand,
(

1913)

,

in

has

Kennerley

claimed that

letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be
subject to the
social sense of what is right, it would seem
that a jury should in
each case establish the standard much as they do in
cases of
negligence (Kalven, 1960, 7).
If

The jury system is one of the fundamental elements
in American

democracy, which promotes and secures the participation of
the "mob" in
the legal arena.

(Toshitani,

1985,

In Japan,

166).

I

the jury system was abolished in 1943
do not think that a jury system necessarily

makes the better decisions or more just decisions, but the
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participation of the people
must make a difference in
judgment. This is
especially true when it comes
to the issue of obscenity,

I

do not

believe that fifteen supposedly
intelligent and decent judges
really
know what ideas about
sexual expression are the
most prevalent among
Lhe

3.

"mob" in the constantly
changing society.

"Prurient Interest" and "Sexual
Arousal"

On the central question;

m

"What is obscenity?," the Supreme
Court

Roth just said that "obscene
material is material which deals
with

sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest"

Lockhart ad McClure,
Latin word

"

1960,

55).

(Roth,

p

.

487

;

cited in

The term "prurient" is derived
from the

pruriens" which means "itching",

"to long for",

(Rmgel, 1970, 93). The concept of
"prurient interest"

"wanton"

is defined by

the Court in its Roth decision
as "having a tendency to excite
lustful

thoughts." On such

a

definition of obscenity, Kalven points out:

The key word "prurient" is defined
by one dictionary in terms of
lascivious longings" and "lewd." The obscene,
then is that which
appeals to an interest in the obscene (Kalven,
1960, 15).

Similarly, Lockhart and McClure point out that:

The definition of obscenity as sexual material
that appeals to
prurient interest, however, merely pushes the central
question
back a notch. If obscenity is sexual material
that appeals to
prurient interest, what is the appeal to prurient interest
that
makes sexual material obscene? What is the essential nature?
(Lockhart and McClure, 1960, 55-6).
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appears that nobody has ever
known, knows, or will
know what
constitutes the essential nature
of obscenity. This
situtation must be
the same in Japan. The
Japanese Supreme Court used
a tern, which is
similar to "appeal to prurient
interest.' In Japan, to be
It

held as

obscene,

desire."

the material has to "wantonly
stimulate and arouse sexual
I

can find no substantial
difference between "appealing
to

prurient interest" and "arousing
sexual desire.” If

I

have to point out

any difference between the
U.S. and the Japanese Supreme
Courts.
would point out the wording of
the Japanese Court - "wantonly."
the word

means just

a

wantonly

I

I

do

-means anything substantial here.
This

mood or image. To put such an
intangible word in the

criteria for a judgment is very
typical of the Japanese courts. How
either the Japanese or the U.S.
Supreme Courts can know whether an

expression arouses sexual desire or
prurient interest in the readers’
mind remains unanswered. Charles
Rembar once said;
the groin of the beholder"

mentioned in Chapter

1,

(Time, July 11

,

1969,

"Pornography is in

39). As previously

what makes the issue of obscenity difficult
is

the gap among individuals with
respect to what constitutes acceptable

or unacceptable sexual

representation. The current "prurient interest"

test is so subjective that it is very
questionable as to how such a

capricious test can be applied universally. What
stimulates an average
person with "prurient interest" can be nothing to
another similarly
average person. What is healthy sex to one average
person can be just

disgusting to another. Just as there are different preferences
for
foods,

there are millions of different standards, tastes, and
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preferences for sex, sexuality,
and sexual representation.
In addition
to the differences in taste,
Ringel points out that age cannot
be
overlooked as a factor to be
considered in measuring prurient
interest
(Ringel,

1970,

99-100).

Another critique points out that
it is questionable if
government
may seek to control people’s
thoughts
thoughts. Ringel says,

-

whether or not they are lustful

"When we speak of ’prurient interest,’
we speak

of what goes on in one's mind"
(Ringel,

1970,

100).

Even if the courts

choose to seek to curb lustful thoughts,
they have another problem in
the practical

application of the "prurient interest" test.
Lockhart and

McClure question:

If, as the Court seems to say,
material that appeals to prurient
interest is material that has a tendency to
excite lustful
thoughts, what degree of causal relationship
between the material
and the thought is required? (Lockhart and
McClure, 1960, 49).

It

was not made clear in Roth whether materials
must evoke

perversion, morbidity, or

a

normal sexual desire to qualify as obscene.

Subsequent case law has refined "prurient interest" to
"a sick and or

morbid interest in sex." To the American Law Institute,

"prurient

interest" is a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or

excretion: it is "an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted interest growing
out of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the

individual and equally universal social controls of sexual activity"
(Lockhart and McClure,

1960,

56).

No one, however, seems to know the

essential nature of "prurient interest," the American Law Institute and
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countless judicial opinions
notwithstanding. Such a vague term
should
not be used as a criterion
for legal judgment.

4.

"Patently Offensive" and "Offend
the Sense of Shame"

In 1954,

Lockhart and McClure, in their
article "Law of

Obscenity," argued that "mere
offensiveness cannot constitutionally

justify censorship"
118).

I

(-'Law of

Obscenity," 378; cited in Clor,

1969,

believe that once mere offensiveness
becomes a legitimate

reason to suppress expression,

freedom of expression will be curtailed

significantly, because "offensiveness"
can be interpreted very

ideologically and politically. Salman Rushdie
once questioned; "What is
freedom of expression? Without freedom
to offend, it ceases to exist."
In the U.S.

and Japan,

however, offensiveness has been regarded
as

a

legitimate reason to regulate obscenity.
In the U.S.,

the Court added the "patently offensive"
test to the

Roth test in Manual Enterprises

v.

Day (1962). Justice Harlan asserted

that the Roth decision established the
"patently offensiveness" concept
no less than the "prurient interest" concept.
On this assertion, Clor

argues that

'

his opinion does not succeed in revealing just where
in

the Roth case this concept is to be found"

Enterprises

v.

Day was

a case

(Clor,

1969,

63-4). Manual

which involved magazines held to be

published primarily for homosexuals. The distinguising features of this
case arise from the fact that the prurience of the magazines was not

contested and was indeed acknowledged by all parties. The publisher

avowed that he had designed
them to appeal to the prurient
interest of
homosexuals (Clor, 1969, 60), The
publishers sought injunctive relief
in the U.S.

District Court. An injunction was
denied, and the denial

was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. The U.S.
Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts. One of
the reasons for reversal was
that
"such magazines which have no
interest for sexually normal
individuals

cannot be legally obscene, since
they are not so offensive on their
face as to affront current community
standards of decency”
1970,

(Ringel.

100-1). The Court held that "the
material challenged under

section 1461 cannot be found to be
obscene unless it is proved to be
both patently offensive and taken as
a whole appeals to prurient

interest" (Ringel,

1970,

101).

In Memoirs

(

1966)

,

Ginsberg

(

1968)

,

and

Hiller (1973), this "patently offensive"
test was affirmed.
In U.S.
it

v.

Kennerley (1913), Judge Learned Hand pointed
out that

seems hardly likely "that shame will for long
prevent us from

adequate portrayal of the most serious and beautiful
side of human
nature"

(Kalven,

1960,

6),

In Japan,

however,

the Supreme Court and

lower courts have traditionally emphasized the
sense of shame in

deciding obscenity cases.
decided in 1980.

It

It

is

true even in the Yojohan case which was

seems to me that this notion of shame, especially

in matters of sexual modesty

(

Seiteki shuchishin

)

a very specific way by the Japanese Supreme Court.

emphasis on "the non-public nature of the sex act"

gensoku

)

has been utilized in

Also,
(

the Court’s

Seikoi hikozen no

and its way of utilizing this concept in judging obscenity are

very peculiar to the Japanese Supreme Court. This must be partially
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attributable to the culture which
has emphasized the notion
of "shame."
will come back to this topic
in the conclusion. The
Japanese Court’s
emphasis and exaggeration of
protection of the sense of shame
I

can be an

unreasonable repression and infringement
of individual freedom of
expression. Is there a pressing
necessity to protect the "sense of
shame"? It seems to me that this
is

minor thing which happens in

a

a

person’s private jurisdiction, especially
in the case of reading
materials. When it comes to problems
involving a captive audience,

offense of the sense of shame is not

a

minor problem.

Another question about the Japanese
criteria for judging obscenity
is the ambiguity of the terms the
courts have used.

The Japanese

Supreme Court set criteria for materials
to be held obscene; they must:
1)

wantonly stimulate and arouse sexual desire:

2)

offend the normal

sense of sexual modesty (sense of shame)
of ordinary persons:

3)

be

contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality.
These three conditions
seem to be very interdependent compared with the
American criteria. For
example,

the second and third seem to be overlapping and
even

repetitive.

It

is hard to imagine material which satisfies the
first

and the second criteria but not the third. Moreover,

the degree of

offensiveness required to render an expression obscene is clearer
in
the American criteria than in the Japanese. The U.S. Supreme
Court,

in

Miller, stated that material has to describe or depict, in a
patently

offensive way, sexual conduct "specifically defined by the applicable
state law.'

The Japanese Supreme Court, on the other hand, has not
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offered such

a

descriptions.

C.

guideline in distinguishing
acceptable and unacceptable
It

is problematic in terms of
"a fair notice."

Basic Differences Between Japan
and the U.S.

There are some elements peculiar
to the Japanese Supreme Court’s
approach. First,

the concept of "the public welfare"
used by the

Japanese judiciary is something more
than "the general welfare" in the

American context.

I

believe that the public welfare doctrine
is so

powerful that freedom of expression in
Japan has been curtailed in an

unreasonably restrictive way. Second, the
U.S. Supreme Court has
focused on the work’s utility or value
in judging obscenity. The

Japanese Court, on the other hand, has
traditionally and consistently-

emphasized "shame" and "sexual morality," which
are very hard to grasp.
Obviously,

the U.S. Court has also been concerned
with sexual morality.

However, the Japanese Court has shown its moralistic
concern more
clearly.

In addition,

I

believe that such notions as

"

Shuchisin" and

"Haji” are something more than just "shame" in
English. These notions

are unique to Japanese culture. Third,

the U.S. Court has used the term

contemporary community standards," which never appeared in any
of the

Japanese Court’s decisions, as the criterion for obscenity. Even
though
this term,

"community standards," is problematically vague, it at least

has a more democratic sound than the Japanese method

judiciary to define "prevailing ideas of society." As
method,

allowing the

-

a

result of this

the Japanese judiciary has appeared to have achieved the status
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Of an authoritative
preacher of morality. This
paternalistic stance of
the judiciary is more
explicit in the Japanese Supreme
Court than its

American counterpart. Probably,
this last difference

is due partly to

the difference in the
judicial process. Unlike the
U.S., Japan has no
jury system. Also, the fact
Japan is much smaller and more
homogeneous
than the U.S. allows for some
judicial differences.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

A.

Harms Caused by "Obscene"
Expression

both Japan and the U.S., it has
been held that freedom of

In

expression is not absolutely unlimited.
In both countries, one of the
unanswered serious questions concerning
obscenity is: What is the real
interest which is to be protected by
regulating obscene expressions? To

regulate or penalize certain acts legally,
there has to be

substantial interest to be protected by such
such

a

a

a

regulation. Otherwise,

regulation would be against the rule of due
process of law. In

the U.S.,

it has been contended that

there are four possible evils:

The incitement to antisocial sexual conduct;
(2) Psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery;
(3) The arousal of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and
(4) The advocacy of improper sexual values (Kalven, 1960.
4).
(1)

In addition,

the impact of obscenity on character can be asserted as
a

fifth possible evil (Kalven,

1.

1960,

4).

Anti-Social Conduct and Sex Crime

One position advocating regulation bases its claim on the concern

with sex crimes and other socially undesirable conduct. Edgar Hoover

116

contended that:

The increase in the number
of sex crimes is due precisely
to sex
literature madly presented in certain
magazines. Filthy literature
is the great moral wrecker
It is creating criminals
faster than
jails can be built (Downs, Ed.,
1960, 24).

Those who advocate the regulation
of obscenity because of this
concern
believe that the thoughts stimulated
by sexually explicit expression
are steps to socially undesirable
actions (Downs. Ed.,

However,

1960.

24).

the link between obscene materials
and sex crimes has not been

established. The report by The Presidential
Commission on Obscenity and

Pornography
that

(

Die Johnson Report")

presented a recommendation saying

"there is no warrant for continued
governmental interference with

the full

freedom of adults to read, obtain or view
whatever such

material they wish" (The Obscenity Report,

1971,

99). This

recommendation was based on their finding that there
was no link
between antisocial conduct and consumption of
pornography. Beer
contends that "(U)ntil highly probable evidence arises
of their

substantial social danger, it might be better to downplay
the content
of erotica as being close to irrelevant to law and
judicial decisions
on obscenity"

(Beer,

1984,

354). Gellhorn argues that those who take

the position of Hoover just overstate the significance of
words and

pictures and understate the other elements of life that shape human
behavior, and that freedom of communication and freedom to read ought
not to be among the sacrifices when the gain is so dubious and the
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deprivation so plain (Downs, Ed.,
1960, 25-6). It has never been
proven
that the danger posed by
obscene materials is sufficient
to justify the
exercise of judicial power for its
suppression. On this point, Pilpel
claims that the ’clear and present
danger" test still appears to be
the
only sound constitutional basis
for regulation. The Supreme
Court has
used this test for all speech and
press with the exception of obscenity
(Downs and McCoy, Eds.,

1984,

236).

It

is not clear why this

test has

not been applied to obscenity.

2.

Juvenile Delinquency

The effect of obscene writings on
juvenile delinquency is another

concern. On this issue, Gellhorn argues that
the most exhaustive study
of juvenile delinquency showed that reading
seems to be of small moment
in shaping antisocial tendencies.

He refers to the study by the Bureau

of Mental Health Services of the Domestic Relations
Court of New York,

which found a marked retardation among the children
whose conduct has
brought them before the court:

Pat from discovering that delinquency grew out of
reading, the
clinicians have discovered that among New Yorkers it is more
likely to grow out of inability to read (Downs, Ed., 1960, 25).

Even if exposure to explicit sexual materials does negatively affect

young persons, it does not necessarily justify limiting freedom of
expression of adults. Moreover, reading materials are different from
visual materials in that the former require intellectual ability to be
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understood.

It

takes time, effort, and ability
to understand the

message contained in reading
materials. Okudaira claims that
a juvenile
who can read and understand
Yojohan, for example, is to be
considered
to possess a certain level
of rationality,
a mature adult

3.

and to be treated equally to

(Okudaira, Tamaki, and Yoshiyuki,

1986,

165).

Stimulation of Sexual Desire and Arousing
Revulsion

Both Supreme Courts have taken it
for granted that materials

stimulating sexual desire or unconventional
sexual ideas are
detrimental. However, should literature be
censored just because it has
the potential to arouse lustful desire?
Even if certain sexually

explicit materials "offend

a

sense of shame" or "arouse lust." it is

not necessarily evident whether or not
offending a sense of shame or

arousing sexual desire is

a

harm which is serious enough to justify the

regulation of otherwise free expression. Gellhorn contends
that
(L)nless the human race is to vanish entirely, we can
scarcely afford
to regard the arousing of normal sexual desires as a
social danger to

be curbed at all costs"

(Downs, Ed.,

1960,

24). There is a position

which advocates the regulation of obscene materials in terms of
people

s

right "not to see." However,

in the case of reading materials,

if one person finds that they are offensive,

reading.

s/he is free to stop

If s/he voluntarily chooses to read something knowing its

offensiveness, should the state intervene to stop him or her from being
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.

offender Kalven argues

that

"(A) rousing disgust and
revulsion in a

voluntary audience seems an
impossibly trivial base for
making speech
(Kalven,

1960,

4).

a

In his article,

"Restraints On Book Reading."
Walter Gellhorn persuasively
presents an argument for freedom
to read:
It

is one

thing to say that nobody
should force upon everybody’s
ling eyes or ears a
communication they deem outrageous
It is
h r thing to say that
must f lrs t
content
; :„r:
of :the
h
communication before it may be
transmitted to
a v body who is willing
to receive it. Books are
voluntarily read
They are not obtruded upon the
passer-by, regardless of his
c oice. To be let alone, as
Justice Brandeis said, is the most
precious of all human rights. In the
one case it dictates that
none should be compelled to read
or listen to what he abhors. In
tie other it dictates that none
should be precluded from writing
or reading as his own rather than
another’s taste may determine
(Downs, Ed.
1960, 40)

—^

nuj

zZe n

,

In

the conclusion of this article,

Gellhorn argues:

Like any other freedom, the freedom
to read can be used unwisely.
But fear that freedom may be improvidently
exercised does not
justify its destruction. Foolish reading
cannot be ended by force
(Downs, Ed., I960, 41).

As he contends,

case of

reading,

reading is

a

very private and voluntary act.

In the

readers are not a captive audience. They choose
to

read and to keep reading. As Kalven argues,
as long as a mature person

voluntarily chooses to read certain materials,

a

government does not

have to worry about the negative feeling s/he might
have owing to the

reading (Kalven,

1960,

4).

On the state’s concern to regulate adult

erotica, Beer contends:
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A

questio^e

paternalism, an excessively
pejorative reading of
° f interest in eroti
»nd
exaggeration
aggeration of the resultant social
benefits seem implied bv a
preoccupation with legal control of
adult erotica (Beer. 1984 ,'

™

ofT'* ‘T

Beer argues that "(U)nder the
right of privacy, as long as
another

person’s right not to be exposed
to erotica against his/her
will is not
violated, the individual adult
should have a constitutional right
to
receive, hear, see, and/or read
erotica" (Beer,

suggests,

I

1984,

354). As Beer

believe that the issue which should
be taken seriously is

the right of people who do not
want to see certain things.

He says;

lore

realistic and reasonable seems a legal
preoccupation with
protecting every man’s right not to have
his privacy with regard
to sex invaded by unwanted and
offensive exposure to salacious
advertising and other selling techniques
(Beer,

I

1984,

354).

believe that the prevailing manner of advertising
and selling

sexually explicit materials in Japan is very
inconsiderate of
individual rights compared with that of the U.S.
During

a

commute to

Tokyo by train, it is inevitable that one sees
salacious advertisements
in the

train,

on the platform,

in the newspapers,

the person sitting next to you is reading.

or in the magazine

Similarly,

the fact that in

Japan pornography is sold in vending machines on the street
reflects

a

lack of sensitivity to people who do not want to see it.
As Beer points
out,

the privacy-based theory is good in the sense that freedom of

expression and the right to know and enjoy according to one’s private
needs, wants, and conscience would receive full protection.
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The Public Welfare Doctrine

4.

The Japanese Supreme Court has
repeatedly maintained that obscene

expression is harmful to the "public
welfare," because "it contains the
danger of inducing a disregard for
sexual morality and sexual order"
(Maki,

1964,

8).

The Japanese Supreme Court has been
criticized for

using this public welfare doctrine very
widely and freely. Besides

Articles

12

and 13 of the Constitution, such
articles as Articles 22

and 29 of the Constitution also contain
the term the "public welfare,"
but none of these provisions makes clear
what the "public welfare" is.

Japan

In

v.

Sugino (1950), the Court presented a definition
of the

public welfare' meaning the maintenance of order
and respect for the

fundamental human rights of the individual, but this
wording is

dangerously wide and too abstract to be a legally workable
definition.
addition to these provisions in the Constitution, Article

In

1

of the

Civil Code prescribes that "(A) 11 private rights shall
conform to the

public welfare." According to the Japanese Supreme Court’s
decisions,
the

"pubic welfare" appears to be the supreme value under the Japanese

Constitution. However, this may actually be

a

supreme value under the

Japanese "communitarian feudal democracy" (Ishida and Kraus, Eds.,
1989,

85), which

I

already mentioned in Chapter

I.

The "public welfare" doctrine has been used to justify the

limitations on freedom. However,
is

I

believe that freedom of expression

essential to the public welfare, not only to the maintenance of the
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public welfare, but also to the
promotion and sophistication of the
public welfare.

5.

Morality

The negative effect on public morality
and sexual values is one of
the major harms allegedly caused by certain
sexually explicit

materials. Both the U.S. and Japanese Supreme
Courts, as we have seen,
have articulated their concern with public
morality on several

occasions. In contemporary society, however, people
can hardly agree on

standards of conduct, language, manners, and on what
can be seen and
heard. The degree of the lack of consensus is different
in the U.S. and

Japan,

but reaching a consensus is increasingly difficult in
both

societies. The Reverend Jerry Falwell, founder of the Moral
Majority,
Inc.,

argues that America

s

traditional values are being undermined by

those who remove God from all public institutions. He claims:

Humanists believe that man is his own god and that moral values
are relative, that ethics are situational... Humanism places man
at the center of the universe... Man lives a meaningless existence
in which the only important thing is for him to make himself happy
in the here and now. It is a philosophy of "do your own thing."
Its slogan is "If it feels good, do it." Neither philosophy offers
moral absolutes, a right and a wrong (O’Neill, Ed., 1985, 153-4).

According to Falwell, this "false" amoral concept of the humanist
threatens the stability of the nation (O’Neill, Ed., 1985, 151). Janice

Raymond formulates this chaos as a "tyranny of tolerance," meaning that

every individual desire has become

a
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political or cultural difference.

.

No value judgment can
be made,
Ed.,

1992,

174

)

because that Is being divisive
(Itzln.

Raymond’s comment is made in her
article "Pornography

and Politics of Lesbianism,"
which is a critical discussion
of Lesbian

sado-masochist groups.

In

this article, she presents
her concern with

the current situation in which
everything is acceptable in the
name of

individual difference.

In a sense,

her concern is sound.

It seems that
we are living in a world which
has no ground for the judgment
of right

or wrong.

In another sense,

however,

this may be an unavoidable
aspect

of a modern liberal society.
In Western societies,
of

the Church has been an influential
preacher

sexual morality for a long time.
However, by the end of the

Protestant reformation, the power of the
Church had been vastly diluted
and passed

largely to the civil authority (Daily,

1973,

213).

Daily

points out that "(I)n maintaining laws
regarding obscenity, the civil

authority was taking over the duties of the
Church" (Daily, 1973, 213).
A secular government, however,

is not supposed to be the paternalistic

administrator of the morality of the nation.

is very questionable

It

whether or not literature can be repressed just
because it offends the
moral code of the censor. David A.J. Richards contends
that obscenity
law

is

a

desperate but doomed attempt to give

a

repressive morality

legal

force"

1993,

201). Richards’ comment was made in his critique of the U.S.

(Richards,

1980,

120;

Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson,

Supreme Court, but it is very applicable to its Japanese counterpart
as
well. The Japanese Supreme Court has repeatedly argued that the

"prevailing ideas of society" are the standard of obscenity, but these
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ideas are not a social reality
but rather something the
Court should
judge. The Japanese Supreme Court
has recognized itself as
being
charged with the clinical role in
maintaining morality. In Paris
Adult
Theatre 1 v. Slaton (1973). the
U.S. Supreme Court used an
argument

similar to the traditional Japanese
approach, which justifies
regulation of certain expression, in
the name of the social interest
of
preserving sound moral order. On the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
in
197.3,

which include the Paris and Miller
cases, Richards argues that

these obscenity decisions incorrectly
"endorsed a particular moral and

political view at the expense of other views
and capacities for
experience, under the guise of making a morally
neutral legal

judgement" (Richards,

1980,

120). Critics such as Justices Black and

Douglas argued that "all obscenity laws are
a

a

form of thought control

-

virulent restraint and a government effort to
regulate not what we

do,

not even what we say,

MacCoy, Eds.,

1984,

235).

but what may come into our minds"
In a democracy,

neither

a

(Downs and

government nor a

court is a preacher of morality. As many Japanese
scholars have argued,
the Japanese Supreme Court

s

claim that the courts are the guardian of

sound morality should be regarded as an arrogation of authority.
Pifpel

claims that many of the Justices are saying, in effect,

"This obscene

materia] which we must look at in the course of our judging process

can't and doesn’t hurt us, but we’re afraid it might hurt the rest of
you”

(Downs and McCoy, Eds.,

1984,

237).

It

appears that the Supreme

Court believes that "those who are qualified to identify evil and

mistake should be empowered to prevent their dissemination" (Downs,
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Ed.,

I960,

21), which is a common belief to
justify censorship.

suspect that this stance allows

a

moral paternalism or even

I

moral

a

totalitarianism. The state which is
dedicated to democratic principles
should not demand our absolute
obedience in every aspect of our
lives.

Democracy is

regime which recognizes that
"there are aspects of human

a

life which the state may not
legitimately control" (Hallowell,
117). Basically,

I

do not

1954

,

think that the judiciary in a
liberal

democracy should judge which ideas are
moral or immoral, pure or
impure, or normal or abnormal. To have
an idea, which might be regarded
as unorthodox or immoral according
to the Court’s standard,

is not

something to be penalized unless it causes
some evident social harm.
In Denmark,

all restrictions on pornography were
dropped by 1969.

This legalization of pornography, however,
(Moskin,

1969.

"doesn’t mean they approve"

73). One Danish psychiatrist,

Dr.

Hertoft, explained the

Danish background by describing that "(P)eople
said we may not like
pornography, but we want to make our own choice. They
don’t accept that
the state wants to be parent of the people"

(Moskin,

1969,

73

).

The

basic questions posed in the removal of restrictions
were as follows:

Why should someone be punished for buying an erotic
book or sexy

picture? Should the power of the state be used to enforce rules
of

morality? Does pornography have
else? (Moskin,

1969,

a

damaging effect on the user or anyone

73). These are questions which have to be answered

before legalization, but most of these questions have never been

seriously examined in either Japan or the U.S. In Denmark, people
decided to let the self-regulating forces of society control the porno
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:

business. This means that people
chose self-determination over
the
paternalistic intervention of government
in preserving sexual morality.

Self-determination is one of the fundamental
premises of democracy. On
the issue of self-determination
and morality,

the Johnson Report

concluded

Governmental regulation of moral choice
can deprive the individual
Of the responsibility for personal
decision which is essential to
the formation of genuine moral
standards. Such regulation would
also tend to establish an official
moral orthodoxy, contrary to
our most fundamental constitutional
traditions (The Obscenity
Report, 1971, 103).

In the L.S.,

Corporation

v.

until the case Kingsley International
Pictures

Regents of the University of New York
(1959), the courts

found material obscene simply because it
challenged current moral

standards. Lockhart and McClure argue that Kingsley
Pictures put an end
to censorship for ideological obscenity.

In this decision,

the Court

ruled that the the constitutional guarantee of
the freedom to advocate
ideas protects the right to advocate that adultery
may be proper in

some circumstances. The main thrust of the opinion in
this ruling was a

declaration of the constitutional right to advocate unconventional
ideas and behavior "immoral” by current standards (Lockhart and

McClure,

1960,

99-100). Given that the objectionable nature of some

ideas played a prominent role in many obscenity decisions before
1959,

Kingsley Pictures certainly marked

a

significant progress.

I

believe

that it is an individual responsibility to decide the best moralilty

among all possible moral standards. One problem is that the principle
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Of individual choice or
self-determination presupposes that
every

individual is a rational moral
agent.

Those who advocate regulating
sexually explicit materials
very
often believe that "obscene”
materials will lead a society
to the

breakdown of sexual morality. The
following claim by Clor is
representative. Clor believes that the
objective of government in
censoring obscenity is not to turn
people’s mind toward more worthy
thoughts, but to inhibit influences
which corrupt moral character.
Constant exposure to literary and visual
materials which
overemphasize sensuality and brutality,
reduce love to sex, and
atantly expose to public view intimacies
which have been thought
sacred or private must eventually result
in an erosion of moral
standards (Clor, 1969, 170).
)

It

seems to me that both Japanese and American
courts have agreed with

Clor. Both judiciaries have been very
fearful of the negative impact of

sexually explicit expression on sexual morality,
and this is why sexual

descriptions have been treated very restrictively

.

However, it is not

necessarily clear why "sexual" morality has been
treated as very
special among various moralities. On this point,
Kalven argues that the

topic of obscenity is freighted with all the anxieties
and hypocrisies
of society’s attitude toward sex (Kalven,

Margaret Mead

s

observation:

1960,

45). Clor cites

"Every known human society exercises some

explicit censorship over behavior relating to the human body,

especially as that behavior involves or may involve sex" (Clor, 1969,
190).

He points out that there is no known society in which matters

relating to sex are left wholly to individuals or to spontaneous social
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activity (dor. 1969. 190).
Further, Clor maintains that (Democracy
cannot be characterized simply
as the maximization of
individual
liberty in every area of life"
and that a person who devoted

exclusively to the satisfaction
of sensual appetites is not
a citizen
body at all (Clor, 1969, 200).
Therefore, he concludes that it
is
natural for government to be
concerned with the sensual side of
life.
Clearly, both the American and
Japanese governments have been highly-

concerned with the sensual side of
life. In Japan’s case, the
Japanese
Supreme Court’s wording in the three
decisions discussed in Chapter III
reflects a very "Japanese" way of
thinking about sex and sexual
representation. The Japanese courts have
repeatedly used the notions
llke

'

nonpublic nature of the sex act" and "sense
of shame." Of course,

the sex act is supposed to be
"nonpublic" in the U.S.,

Supreme Court, however, never used such

a

too.

The U.S.

term in its decisions. The

Japanese seem to consider not only the sex act
itself but also the mere

discussion of sex as nonpublic. Traditionally, sex
has been considered
as something concealed and as something
exclusively kept inside

marriage. Gellhorn points out that the concept of
obscenity is itself
product of censorship and concealment.

The Japanese, conditioned by their training to regard
kissing as
an entirely private exercise, are said to find American
movies
filled with obscenity because they unabashedly portray
heterosexual osculation; and as a consequence films that do not

bring a blush to the most demure Americans must be drasticallyedited before they are deemed appropriate for general exhibition
in Japan (Downs, Ed., 1960, 22).
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This comment was made in
1956, and the situation has
since changed.
Abramson and Hayashi found that
Japanese regulations of
pornography are
even looser than American
regulations in several senses
(Malamuth and

Donnerstein, Eds.,

1984,

173-183). However, it is my
pereeption that

the Japanese in the 1990s still
regard sex as something which
should
not be discussed openly. Every
decent, it seems, person is
supposed to

behave as if s/he had nothing to
do with sex. This cultural
heritage
may be interpreted as extreme modesty
or shyness. Yet, I think such
a

Japanese attitude toward sex is different
from Puritan anti-sex-

morality which is inherently highly
repressive about sex itself.

It

is

widely recognized that the U.S. became
much more permissive toward
sexual representations since the 1960s.
Apparently, American society is
now open about sex and sexuality. However,
at bottom, repressive

attitudes toward sex, sexuality, and sexual
representation still seem
to be surviving in American culture,

because of perennial Puritanism.

For a long time, abortion and homosexuality
have been discussed in the

light of religious and moral value judgments. The
discussion of

obscenity and pornography also seems to reflect this
sexual morality
rooted in Puritanism.

B.

It

Modern Doctrine of Free Speech

is very questionable that certain expression should be

prohibited simply because it is embarrassing and distasteful to the
majority, or disgusting to average sensibilities.
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It

is my opinion that

the concept of "offensiveness”
can be given a political
interpretation
by the majority or/and
government. If pure distaste can
be the ground
for suppression of a particular
expression,

he significantly limited.

freedom of expression will

If the First Amendment

permits the government

to suppress a publication
which is offensive to a particular
judge,

freedom under the First Amendment
can be limited very arbitrarily.

Charles Rembar,

the lawyer who won in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts (1966)

argued that "(T)he (First) amendment
is not designed to give effect
to
majority wishes." As Rembar pointed
out, for that, no First Amendment
is

required. Freedom of speech and of the
press means freedom for what

the majority thinks is bad. or thinks
is evil, or dislikes, or even

hates with unequivocal hate (Friedman, Ed.,
1970,

11-2 in

Introduction). Perhaps, this original philosophy
of the First .Amendment
is already forgotten or undermined.
In

the Communist view,

there is no room for argument about the

desirability of suppressing disturbing ideas:

Uhy should freedom of speech and freedom of the
press be
allowed?" Lenin asked. "Why should a government which
is doing
what it believes to be right allow itself to be
criticized?
W'hy should any man be allowed to buy
a printing press and
disseminate pernicious opinions calculated to embarrass the
government?" (Downs, Ed., 1960, 27).

Gellhorn claims that he fears that there are non-Communist Americans
who may share this particular bit of the hated ideology (Downs, Ed.,
1960,

27).
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Since 1791 the First .Amendment
has stood as a safeguard
of the
fr edom of expression.
The doctrine of political
freedom it is
‘ U
implement ls not a bit of
eighteenth-century
muddleh
muddleheadedness.
It reflects, rather, the
lesson learned from
history that truth cannot be
established by proclamation and
that
non-believers
(Downs.
271™
.

^

I960

.Judge Hand once argued that

"any organization of society
which

depresses free and spontaneous meddling
is on the decline, however
showy its immediate spoils" (Downs,
Ed.,

1960,

28). Gellhorn maintains

that the proscription of writings
because of their feared effects on

accepted beliefs is not only unconstitutional
but also unwise (Downs,
Ed.,

1960,

27).

Donald A. Downs points out that the
First .Amendment is based on
such liberal precepts as the legal
tolerance and marketplace of ideas.

The principle of legal tolerance is
that "individuals and society must

tolerate disagreeable speech unless it is
clearly dangerous, part of
criminal action, or conspicuously without social
value" (Downs, 1989.
The liberal approach holds that the best way
to achieve political

4).

and social justice is through an open marketplace
of ideas (Downs,
1989,

4).

Justice Holmes once maintained that "the best test of
truth

is the power of the thought

to get itself accepted in the competition

of the market"

1960,

(Downs, Ed.,

21). Richards also claims that we can

never be sure of knowing what the truth is, and the most likely way
of

approximating it and preserving

a

democratic society is to maintain

free marketplace of ideas (Hunter, Saunders, and Williamson,
200

)

.
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1993,

a

Sexually explicit materials have
been treated as outside this
free
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, "(I)t
is hard to see why the
advocacy of
improper sexual values should fare
differently, as a consitutional
matter, from any other exposition
in the realm of ideas"

4).

Pilpel says,

(Kalven,

1960.

"There should be as free a marketplace
for sexual

ideas and descriptions as we have
now with reference to other kinds
of

ideas and descriptions (Downs and
McCoy, Eds.,

1984,

236). As to the

regulation of obscenity, there are two
opposing positions. One is that
the restriction of obscene materials
from society is a threat to

freedom

of

expression, because

it

is an attempt

to prevent people from

holding particular views about sexual
relations and behavior. On the
other hand,

there is an argument that obscene materials
are an appeal

to the libido,

not to reason,

and therefore are not within the area of

expression protected by the First Amendment at all.
My idea is close to
the former position.

I

believe that rejecting particular ideas

concerning sexuality and sexual relations is incompatible
with the
fundamental idea of the marketplace of ideas, which is
based on

tolerance of diversity among the values each individual holds.
In addition to

the marketplace of ideas and legal tolerance,

four

other assumptions underlie the modern doctrine of free speech. First,
the modern doctrine of free speech assumes that the individual
citizen
is autonomous and responsible.

Speakers are not held responsible for

illegal actions taken in response to their speech, unless the speech

incites immediate lawless action. Second, the modern doctrine takes
limited notion of equality, defined as equal treatment under the law
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and equal opportunity to
compete in the public forum or
marketplace of
ideas. This notion of equality
entails state neutrality in
allocating
the right to speech. Third,
the modern doctrine's concept
of

citizenship and right applies to the
individual rather than
group. Fourth,

the doctrine makes a basic,

a

class or

if imperfect and inexact,

distinction between speech and action.
Speech is protected unless it
constitutes unlawful or tortuous action
or is directly tied to unlawful
action, such as libel,
(Downs,

1989,

incitement, solicitation, conspiracy
or the like

5).

Downs referred to this modern doctrine
of free speech in his

critique

of

the anti-pornography ordinance authored
in late 1983 by

MacKinnon and Dworkin.

In this paper,

I

have not explored the area of

pornography as distinct from obscenity, since it
is another huge topic.
However,

I

need to mention briefly this anti-pornography
ordinance

since it embraces another important dimension of
the contemporary

discussion over sexually explicit materials. By means of
this
ordinance, two nationally prominent anti-pornography feminists
brought

about

a

controversy concerning the regulation of pornography. Their

ant i -pornography ordinance is based on the belief that
the current

framework of the First Amendment protects only the freedom of speech of
men,

and silences women at the same time. The authors basically

challenged the state neutral doctrine as inappropriate. They attack the
traditional "obscenity" approach as being sex-neutral, and thus

incompatible with reality. What was new about the logic of this
ordinance was their formulation of pornography as sex discrimination,
134

thus a Violation of women’s
civil rights. They basically
defined

pornography as materials which
eroticize dominance and submission,
or
depict women in a degrading manner.
Even though this ordinance
had
problems in terms of its
constitutionality, its new approach
was at
Ipast inspiring and innovative.
In

1986.

in American Booksellers
Association Inc.

v.

Hudnut,

the

ordinance was held unconstitutional.
The U.S. Supreme Court cited the
appellate court decision in Chicago that
the Indianapolis law was an
attempt at "thought control," and affirmed,
without issuing an opinion
the rulings by lower courts.

In fact,

Dworkin and MacKinnon dealt with

pornography not as mere speech, but as
action. According to Andrea
Dworkin’

s

(Dworkin,

theory,
1989,

thoughts and ideas are made "as suspect as
actions"

156). This merging of speech and action was
severely

criticized. Another criticism is that this
ordinance’s definition of

pornography was based on

a

sexist viewpoint. With this ordinance,

MacKinnon and Dworkin questioned both the First Amendment
itself and
underlying modern doctrine of free speech. Their claim
is that "(T)he

modern doctrine of free speech,

...

assumes an essential equality of

social condition that simply does not exist, so it
perpetuates the

power of the gender favored by the status quo" (Downs,

1989,

15

in

Introduction). All of the above-mentioned four assumptions underlying
the modern doctrine of free speech were challenged by these feminists.

First, under the ordinance, speakers (makers of pornography) are held

responsible for the crimes committed by its users. Second, the

ordinance requires states to go beyond the neutral position. Third, the
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ordinance treats women as

a

group, which is counter to
the

individualistic presumption. Fourth,
the ordinance merges speech
with
action.
To a certain extent,

the concern of anti-pornography
feminists

with sexist images and messages
carried by pornography is reasonable.
However, the liberal doctrine of
free speech has to be preserved
in a
"liberal- democracy. The First .Amendment,
even if it has

a

problem

according to the anti-pornography
feminists’ view, largely relies on
liberal principles. In the anti-pornography
feminists’ view,

constitutional framework, which is based on

a

the

liberal philosophy, is

totally dominated by male interests. This
argument is just like their
typical contention that every act of sex
between heterosexuals is total

war and domination.

In Andrea Dworkin’s view,

sex is power, and all

power belongs to the man. Downs claims that the
anti-pornographv

ordinance lacked perspective and

a

sense of limits. He contends that

"(I)f all liberal reality was a hell of domination,

pornography ordinance was
1989,

50).

In summary,

a

the anti-

promise of total, utopian justice” (Downs,

Dworkin and MacKinnon’s ordinance is not

acceptable under the current American constitutional framework,
because
their merger of speech and action is incompatible with the liberal

principle of free speech which is one of the foundations of democracy.
However,

they were successful at least in giving people a new

perspective.

In Japan,

the discussion of sexually explicit materials is

still limited to the one which is based on the tradtional moralistic

"obscenity" perspective, which is sex-neutral. The formulation of
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pornography as

a

form of sex discrimination has
not. as yet. been

really prevalent in Japan.

I

do not think that anybody
has ever

attacked Article 21 of the Constitution
by saying. "Freedom of

expression under this article is
beneficial only for men. and is
oppressive for women." Clearly, there
are lots of inequalities between
men and women in Japan, and men
are privileged in many ways. It
is
interesting that the argument focusing
on sexism has not been presented
in Japan, which appears to be
more sexist and more patriarchal than
the

U.S.

C.

Freedom of Expression and Liber al Democracy

Both the U.S. and Japan belong to the category
of "liberal

democracy."

In a democracy,

the majority has the right to restrain an

individual’s liberty "in order to protect society from
potential harm
and to support communitarian norms or sexual virtue"
(Hall. Ed..

602-3).
is a

In a

liberal state, however,

1992

tolerance of individual diversity

fundamental rule. Also, according to liberal principles, not only

potential harm but "direct, demonstrable harm to others" (Hall, Ed.,
1992,

603)

is required before restricting expression.

these two theses are inherently contradictory.

I

In this sense,

believe that such a

popular slogan as "Freedom and Peace" is also inherently contradictory.
If we pursue

absolute freedom, we have to accept the possible

disruption of peace.

If we want perfect peace,

certain freedoms in exchange. Similarly,
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we have to give up

believe that freedom of

expression inherently has the
potential to disturb decency or
the
conventional moral code. Yet. the
First Amendment largely relies
on
liberal principles.

In a "liberal” democracy,

the liberal doctrine of

free speech has to be preserved
and respected as much as
possible. As

Downs claims, the liberal approach
to the First Amendment is
"necessary
to an open society, and an
open society is a necessary condition
for

achieving social justice," and "state
neutrality is still necessary to
any workable regime of free speech"
(Downs,

1989,

146).

Even if

allegedly obscene material contains
objectionable expression or ideas,
these ideas are still ideas. As long as
speech is just taking the form
of speech, and as long as an idea stays
an idea,

protect them. Moreover,

liberal principles

believe that freedom to know includes the

I

freedom to know the darker or the hidden sides
of human nature and
society.

Freedom of expression is different from other
freedoms in that it
is not only an end itself but also a means
of obtaining other things.

Fieedom of expression is a means of securing other
fundamental human
rights, and of maintaining a democratic order (Okudaira,

Justice Benjamin Cardozo

matrix

-

s

words,

1988,

59).

In

freedom of speech and press is "the

the indispensable condition" of our other freedoms (Downs and

McCoy, Eds.,

1984,

237).

In this sense,

infringement of freedom of

expression is something more than just infringement of one freedom.
This is why we should be very careful in restricting this freedom.

Freedom of expression is intimately related to the idea and
practice of a democracy. Emerson argues that "(T)he crucial point
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...

IS not

that

freedom of expression is
politically useful, but that it is
indispensable to the operation of
a democratic form of
government"

(Emerson,

1963,

10).

Because freedom of expression is
such an important

factor in a democracy, Emerson
argues that the limitation on it
should
be restricted to exceptional
cases. Similarly, Gellhorn claims,

'(S)inre the free flow of words is
essential to the proper functioning
of our governmental and intellectual
institutions,

restrictions upon

that flow should be regarded as
abnormalities requiring especially

convincing justification" (Downs, Ed.,
1960, 38). In the area of
obscenity, as we can see in both Japanese and
American cases, it is
hard to say there is a convincing justification
for regulating certain

expression. The regulations in both countries
have been largely based
on ideological biases on the side of the
courts, which reject ideas

challenging the current moral standards. Such an
ideological

intervention by the state is regarded as illegitimate
in other areas of
expression, but obscenity has been treated as an exception
because it

allegedly affects sexual morality, about which the states
have been

exceptionally nervous.
As long as we cannot prove any substantial harm to be prevented
by

restricting publication or distribution of obscene materials, the

regulation of certain expression would be inherently
freedom of expression and to a liberal society.

I

a

threat to

do not think such

alleged harms as an increase in sex crime, juvenile delinquency,
offense of readers’ sense of shame, danger of indulging in sex, and
moral deterioration can reasonably justify the regulation of certain
139

sexually explicit materials.

I

believe that they are either
too trivial

or not well-proven to be
a solid justification for
restricting

otherwise free expression. Moreover,

I

do not think that restricting

publication and distribution of certain
sexually explicit materials is
either essential or effective in
preserving sexual morality and
dignity. Article 175 of the Japanese
Criminal Code, which penalizes

publication and distribution of "obscene"
materials altogether is
dangerously broad. However,

I

am not saying that current methods
of

producing, advertising, presenting, and
distributing sexually explicit

materials are without problems. As mentioned
already, regulation based
on the right of privacy is something the
courts should think about

seriously.
Basically,

I

have taken a position favoring freedom of sexual

expression. Yet, Suzanne Kappeler’s argument, which follows,
makes me
rethink whether or not the "No Censorship" position is
the most

desirable. She claims that "(T)he freedom our society protects
is not
the freedom of expression,
1992,

89),

but the freedom of the market"

(Itzin, Ed.,

and continues;

To be "for freedom of expression," when that means being for the
status quo of the market and the pornography industry, can by no
stretch of the imagination be seen as being for freedom... "No
Censorship" position does not mean a shift of responsibility from
the state to the individual, but a shrinking of all responsibility
(Itzin, Ed., 1992, 90-1).

Especially when it comes to the pornography industry, this problem
serious. Pornography, which

I

is

did not examine in this paper, has been
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an important issue in the
U.S.

As Kappeler points out,

and has been emerging as such
in Japan.

this is an issue not only about
expression but

also about market. There are people
who are profiting by taking

advantage of other people’s prurient
interests. Also, in the

pornography industry, women and children
are exploited economically and
sexually. The pornography industry
is an industry which exploits
the
poorest and most vulnerable group of
population. Once

established,

a

freedom is

there always appear people who abuse
the freedom.

It

is

not known whether the pornography industry
exists to satisfy the

demand, or people buy pornography just
because there is an available
supply. Kappeler

’

s

comments makes one notice another dimension of
this

issue
Tt

is unlikely that

the Courts of Japan and the U.S. will suddenly

stop regulating allegedly obscene materials.
to regulate them,

If the Courts still choose

the standard of obscenity should at least be placed

on "the prevailing ideas of society," not in the
sense the Japanese

Court has been using it, but in a real sense. This will approximate
what the American courts have been calling "contemporary community

standards." The standard of obscenity must be "contemporary" and
reflect the prevailing ideas, which keep changing. To set such

standards, as D.H. Lawrence claimed,

the judgment should be left not to

particular judges but to the majority of

a

community. That is a

fundamental rule of democracy.
However, as Toqueville warned, in

a

democracy, there is such a

thing as "the tyranny of the majority." There is always a danger in a
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democracy that the majority will
impose its will on

a

why freedom of expression needs
special protection In

minority. This is
a

democracy.

Hallowell argues that the principle
of majority rule does not mean
that
we abandon all qualitative
judgments in favor of a quantitative
method.
If

the principle of majority rule
means that the will of the
majority must be conceived as unlimited
and absolute, then it is
principle, as the framers of our
Constitution realized, that is
indistinguishable from tyranny. For the
essence of tyranny is
unrestrained will -- whether it be the will
of one man, of
several, or of many. And the tyranny of
a majority is no less
cruel or unjust - indeed, may be more so than the tyranny of a
single individual (Hallowell, 1954, 120).

a

'

As Hallowell points out,

the principle of majority rule does not
mean

the will of majority should unconditionally
prevail over the will of
the

few.

Rather,

this principle is founded upon the belief that
"the

widest possible popular discussion and participation
in the formation
of policy is likely to yield wiser decisions than
a discussion limited
to the few"

(Hallowell,

and participation,

1954,

121). To secure the popular discussion

freedom of expresion is essential. Once freedom of

expression becomes a formality in

a

constitution, a liberal democracy

can easily become something not entirely different from

totalitarianism.

In this sense,

I

believe that Charles Rembar’s claim

highlights a very crucial characteristic of freedom of expression in
democracy:

Freedom of speech and of the press means freedom for what the
majority thinks is bad, or thinks is evil, or dislikes, or even
hates with unequivocal hate (Friedman, Ed., 1970, 11-2 in
Introduction)
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If the courts choose to
regulate expressions,

they have to be extremely

careful not to allow "the tyranny
of the majority- to control
the
situation. Specifically concerning
sexual expression, it seems to
be

very easy to allow control by the
tyranny of the majority in both
the
U.S.

and Japan.
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